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Abstract—The rise of contactless and wireless devices such as
mobile phones and RFID chips justifies significant concerns over
privacy, and calls for communication protocols that ensure some
form of unlinkability. Formally specifying this property is difficult
and context-dependent, and analysing it is very complex; as is
common with security protocols, several incorrect unlinkability
claims can be found in the literature. Formal verification is
therefore desirable, but current techniques are not sufficient
to directly analyse unlinkability. In [21], two conditions have
been identified that imply unlinkability and can be automatically
verified. That work, however, only considers a restricted class
of protocols. We adapt their formal definition as well as their
proof method to the common setting of RFID authentication
protocols, where readers access a central database of authorised
users. Moreover, we also consider protocols where readers may
update their database, and tags may also carry a mutable state.
We propose sufficient conditions to ensure unlinkability, find new
attacks, and obtain new proofs of unlinkability using Tamarin to
establish our sufficient conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our societies, practically everybody carries digital devices
whose communications may happen, unnoticed, at any time.
While most of these communications rely on cryptography to
ensure secrecy or authenticity, little is done to protect the user’s
privacy. Contactless cards and cell phones reveal identities in
clear [30], [31], and several traceability attacks are available
even when anonymity is ensured [6], [7], [21], [13]. It has
thus become easy to track individuals through their personal
devices. To avoid such threats to privacy, we need protocols
that ensure unlinkability [22]: an outside observer must not
be able to tell whether two uses of the protocol are related or
not. Privacy concerns and the need for unlinkability are slowly
being accepted by the industry, e.g. the 5G PPP consortium [4].
Designing unlinkable protocols does not require cutting-
edge cryptography, but it is a very difficult task. As is generally
true of security protocols, defending against an arbitrary active
attacker involves too many details that are easily overlooked.
History has told us that formal methods are very useful in that
domain, both to find attacks and to obtain security proofs that
can be trusted. This is particularly true with unlinkability, for
several reasons. First, the informal notion of unlinkability does
not translate to a single formal definition. Several definitions
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of unlinkability have been proposed, e.g. [34], [23], [32], [6],
[15], [16], [21]: leaving aside the different formal models,
these definitions provide varying degrees of security, corre-
sponding to different attack scenarios. Given a protocol with
some intended use case, it is not immediately obvious which
definition provides strong enough guarantees. Second, most
definitions of unlinkability rely on some form of behavioural
equivalence, which makes proofs even more difficult — this is
a general problem when dealing with privacy notions, which
has motivated a recent alternative approach which can avoid
equivalences in some cases, not including unlinkability so
far [28]. Proofs of equivalences are cumbersome, and we
believe that they cannot realistically be carried out in details
by hand. Regarding mechanisation, several mature tools are
available for analysing trace properties such as secrecy or
authentication: for instance, ProVerif [11], [1], the Avantssar
platform [9] and Tamarin [26], [2] are very successful. How-
ever, even if some of these tools have been extended to support
equivalences, they remain limited. Specifically, ProVerif [12]
and Tamarin [10] can only prove very restricted forms of
equivalences, called diff-equivalences, which are too limiting
for unlinkability [21]. All these reasons explain why there
are currently only few formal proofs of unlinkability. For
instance, we may note the manual but very detailed proof
of unlinkability for a variant of AKA by Koutsos [24] and
the mechanised proofs of e-passport and RFID protocols by
Hirschi et al. [21] using ProVerif. Both of these works have
lead to the discovery of new attacks on protocols that were
previously claimed unlinkable.
Given the current impossibility and certain difficulty of di-
rectly verifying unlinkability, [21] adopted an approach based
on sufficient conditions. The authors identify two conditions
that correspond to two broad classes of attacks on unlinkabil-
ity, and show that these two conditions imply unlinkability.
Moreover, they show that the conditions can be verified
directly using e.g. ProVerif, which they successfully use on
several case studies. Let us briefly describe these conditions.
First, frame opacity states that, for every execution of the
protocol against an active adversary, relations between mes-
sages never leak information about the involved agents. This
property is expressed using a notion of message idealisation,
and can be verified using (an extension of) ProVerif’s diff-
equivalence. Then, well-authentication states that, whenever
the outcome of a conditional is positive, the corresponding
agent is having an honest interaction with a counterpart of
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the expected identity. This ensures that the attacker cannot
learn anything about identities by (indirectly) observing the
outcome of conditionals. In practice, it is easy to verify well-
authentication as it is a traditional correspondence property.
The main limitation of the work of [21] is that it does not
cover stateful protocols, which is important for two reasons.
First, many authentication protocols involve a database ac-
cessed by readers to check the credentials of an RFID device
(aka. tag). In its simplest form, this global state is monotonic,
i.e. database entries are never modified nor removed. Second,
the secret shared by each tag with the readers is often updated
to achieve forward privacy. Analysing protocols with such non-
monotonic state is notoriously difficult. Whereas Tamarin has
been designed to support stateful protocols from the beginning,
there have been several attempts to add global states to
ProVerif and other tools, e.g. StatVerif [8], Set-Pi [14], AIF-
ω [27]. The most recent one, GSVerif [17], enriches ProVerif
models to achieve better precision, which leads to several
successes on trace properties.
Contributions and outline. In this paper, we revisit the work
of [21] with a focus on protocols where the readers rely on a
global database and each tag carries a local state. This setting
is formally described in Section II. We show in Section III
that existing notions of unlinkability are inadequate for our
protocols, even when tags do not update their state, and pro-
pose a definition that precisely reflects the intended use case.
Since the direct verification of unlinkability with available
tools remains out of reach, we adapt the method of [21]
in Section IV. In particular, we design a third condition to
obtain sufficient conditions for our definition of unlinkability.
We discuss in Section V how these three conditions can be
mechanically verified using Tamarin [26], [2], and present case
studies in Section VI.
Before entering into the formal details, let us briefly
comment on our sufficient conditions. First, frame opac-
ity is directly inherited from [21], and we also verify it
as a diff-equivalence, although using Tamarin rather than
ProVerif, with some manual guidance or pre-processing for
most cases. Well-authentication is also inherited from [21],
with a minor technical difference. However, it is important
to observe that, in the stateless setting of [21], the converse
of well-authentication was obvious: honest interactions lead
to successful conditionals. The situation changes in a setting
where the tags’ states may evolve, possibly desynchronise
with the readers’ database, with an impact on the outcome
of future honest interactions. This leads to our new condition,
no desynchronisation, which requires that an honest interaction
between a tag and a reader cannot fail, i.e. the outcome of its
conditionals is always positive.
To illustrate how a desynchronisation can lead to an attack
on unlinkability, let us consider a simple protocol between tags
and readers. Each tag carries a state kT , initialised with some k
that is also stored as a new entry in the readers’ database.
The protocol consists of a single message from the tag to the
reader, which is a hash of the tag’s state, written g(kT ). When
receiving an input, the reader checks that it matches g(kR)
for a kR in its database. At the end of the session, tag and
reader update their state by applying another hash function h
to it: kT ← h(kT ) and kR ← h(kR). This protocol is easily
desynchronised: an attacker could intercept the first output of
a tag, which nevertheless updates its state, rendering all future
interactions with readers unsuccessful since no state in the
database will match the updated state of the tag. Once a tag
has been desynchronised, an honest session fails if, and only
if, it involves that tag: this is a failure of unlinkability.
II. MODEL FOR PROTOCOLS
We model security protocols in the symbolic model with
a process algebra inspired from the applied pi calculus [5].
Participants are represented by processes while messages
exchanged between participants are represented by terms.
We consider a specific class of protocols: stateful 2-party
protocols between a tag and a reader. In order to model the
stateful nature of these protocols, we assume that each tag
has a memory cell to store the successive values of its state,
whereas the readers have access to a global database.
A. Term algebra
We assume an infinite set N of names used to represent
atomic private data such as keys, or nonces; and two infinite
and disjoint sets of variables X and W . Variables in X are
used to refer e.g. to input messages and variables in W ,
called handles, are used as pointers to messages learned by
the attacker. We assume a signature Σ, i.e. a set of function
symbols, split into constructors and destructors: Σ = Σc ⊔Σd.
We note T (F ,D) the set of terms built from elements of
the set of initial data D by applying function symbols in
the signature F . We refer to elements of T (Σc,N ∪ X ) as
constructor terms. We define vars(t) as the set of variables
that occur in a term t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ) and call message a
constructor term u that is ground, i.e. such that vars(u) = ∅.
We use the vector notation (for example x) to denote a
(possibly empty) sequence. The domain of a substitution σ
is noted dom(σ), and its application to a term t is noted tσ.
The positions of a term are defined as usual.
We split the signature Σ into two sets, Σpub and Σpriv,
to distinguish function symbols that are public (available to
the attacker) from others that are private. A computation
performed by the attacker, modelled by a term in T (Σpub,W),
is called a recipe. Our attacker cannot generate fresh names,
but we may assume instead an infinite set of public constants
available to the attacker in the set Σc ∩Σpub.
Example 1: Let ΣBH = {h, ⟨⟩,proj1,proj2, eq,ok, error}.
The function symbol h represents a hash function of arity 2.
We model the pairing function with symbol ⟨⟩ of arity 2, and
projections with proj1/proj2 of arity 1. The binary symbol eq
is used to model equality tests. Finally, symbols ok and error
of arity 0 model public constants. All these function symbols
are public. Constructors are given by ΣBHc = {h, ⟨⟩,ok, error},
and destructors by ΣBHd = {proj1,proj2, eq}.
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In order to provide a meaning to constructor symbols,
we equip constructor terms with an equational theory. We
assume a set of equations E over T (Σc,X ) and define =E
as the smallest congruence containing E that is closed under
substitutions and under bijective renaming.
Example 2: Consider Σ⊕ = Σ⊕c = {⊕,0} where ⊕ is
binary and 0 is a constant. The standard equational theory E⊕
modelling the exclusive or operator is the following:
x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
x⊕ x = 0 x⊕ 0 = x
For instance, with a, b ∈ N , we have that a⊕ (a⊕ b) =E⊕ b.
Then, we give a meaning to destructors through an ordered
rewrite system, i.e. an ordered set of rules g(t1, . . . , tn)→ t
where g is a destructor and t, t1, . . . , tn are constructor terms.
A ground term u can be rewritten into v if there is a position p
in u, a rewrite rule g(t1, . . . , tn) → t and a substitution θ
from variables to messages such that u∣p = g(t′1, . . . , t′n),
t′1 =E t1θ, . . . , t′n =E tnθ and v =E u[tθ]p (i.e. u in which
the subterm at position p has been replaced by tθ). In the
case where more than one rule may be applied at position p,
only the first such rule can be effectively used. Given a ground
term u, it may be possible to rewrite it (in an arbitrary number
of steps) into a message: in that case, this message is noted u⇓.
We write u⇓̸ when no such message exists, and say that the
computation fails.
Example 3: Going back to Example 1, we consider the
following rules to represent the properties of symbols in ΣBHd :
proj1(⟨x1, x2⟩)→ x1 proj2(⟨x1, x2⟩)→ x2 eq(x,x)→ ok
When u, v are messages, eq(u, v)⇓̸ if, and only if, u ≠E v.
B. Process algebra
We consider a set C of channel names assumed to be public.
We also consider an infinite set R of references to represent
memory cell addresses of tags. We assume that R and N (the
set of names defined in Section II-A) are disjoint.
Protocols will be modelled as processes given by the
grammar in Figure 1. We will not comment on the stan-
dard constructs of this grammar (i.e. name restriction, input,
output, parallel). The process P ;Q represents the sequential
composition of processes P and Q and will only have a
meaningful semantics under some conditions on P (this will
be detailed later on). The replication !P can be understood as
the infinite parallel composition P ∣ (P ∣ (P ∣ . . .)) while the
repetition
!
P corresponds to an infinite sequential composition
P ; (P ; (P ; . . .)). The process let x = t in P else Q (where
x and t are two sequences of the same length, respectively
containing variables and terms) combines computations with a
conditional: it attempts to evaluate t, executes P with x bound
to the resulting messages upon success, and Q otherwise1.
Next, we have constructs for dealing with memory cells,
used by tags: new r.P introduces a new cell with undefined
contents before executing P , where get and set constructs
1The use of sequences x and t here is superfluous in terms of expres-
siveness but allows for a more convenient definition of our notion of well-
authentication.
may be used to respectively lookup or update the contents
of r. Finally, two constructs model the database shared by all
readers: insert to add a value to the database, and lookup for
both looking up and updating the database. More specifically,
lookup y such that x = t, y′ = t′ in P else Q attempts to find
some value v in the database such that t{y ↦ v} and t′{y ↦ v}
evaluate successfully to w and v′ respectively; upon success it
replaces v with v′ in the database and executes P with y, y′, x
bound to v, v′,w; otherwise, it executes Q.
The constructs in and get (resp. let) bind variable x (resp. x)
in their first sub-process. The construct lookup binds y in
t, t′ and y, y′, x in its first sub-process. The free variables
fv(P ) of a process P are defined accordingly. We also define
fn(P ) as the set of names occurring in P not bound by a new
construct, and similarly for free references fref (P ). Processes
are identified modulo α-renaming for bound variables, names
and references. A process P is closed when fv(P ) = ∅.
Example 4: As a running example, we consider the Basic
Hash protocol as described in [15]. Each tag stores a secret
key that is never updated, and the readers have access to a
database containing all these keys. The protocol is as follows:
T → R ∶ ⟨nT ,h(k,nT )⟩
where nT is a fresh nonce and k is the secret key.
When receiving a message, the reader checks that it is a
pair whose second element is a hash of one of the keys from
the database, using the first element of the pair as hashing key.
The protocol can be modelled in our syntax by:
PBH = (!R) ∣ (! new k.new r.set(r, k).insert(k). !newnT .T )
T = get(r, y).out(cT , ⟨nT ,h(y, nT )⟩)
R = in(cT , z).
lookup y such that x = eq(proj2(z),h(y,proj1(z)))),
y′ = y in out(cR,ok)
else out(cR, error).
C. Semantics
The operational semantics of processes is given by a labelled
transition system over configurations (denoted by K) which
are triplets (P;φ;S) where:
● P is a multiset of closed processes where null processes
are implicitly removed;● φ = {w1 ↦ u1, . . . ,wn ↦ un} is a frame representing
the knowledge of the adversary, i.e. a substitution where
w1, . . . ,wn are handles and u1, . . . , un are messages;● S = (ST ,SR) is a store split into two parts:
– ST is a substitution mapping references to messages,
representing the current contents of memory cells,
such that fref (P) ⊆ dom(ST );
– SR is a set of messages representing the global
database shared by the readers.
We note store(K) the store of a configuration K. We
sometimes use P as a configuration; it stands for (P;∅;∅).
The operational semantics of processes is given by labelled
transitions K
αÐ→ K ′, where K and K ′ are configurations
and α is an action of the form in(c,R), out(c,w), τ , τabort,
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P,Q ∶= 0 null process∣ newn.P name restriction n ∈ N∣ new r.P reference restriction r ∈R∣ in(c, x).P input c ∈ C, x ∈ X∣ out(c, u).P output c ∈ C, u ∈ T (Σc,N ∪X )∣ let x = t in P else Q evaluation x ∈ X k, t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪X )k∣ get(r, x).P memory cell lookup r ∈R, x ∈ X∣ set(r, v).P memory cell insertion r ∈R, v ∈ T (Σc,N ∪X )∣ lookup y such that x = t, y′ = t′ in P else Q database test and update (y, y′, x) ∈ X k+2, and (t′, t) ∈ T (Σ,N ∪X )k+1∣ insert(v).P database insertion v ∈ T (Σc,N ∪X )∣ (P ∣ Q) parallel composition∣ !P replication∣ P ;Q sequence∣ !P repetition
Fig. 1. Syntax of processes
τelse or τthen. The definition of these transitions is given in
Figure 2. In that figure we refer to the free names of frames
and stores, which are defined as expected: fn(φ) (resp. fn(S))
is the set of names appearing in the messages of φ (resp. S).
Rule IN allows the attacker to send on channel c a message
u, provided that it is the result of a computation, modelled
by R, that applies public function symbols to messages from
the frame, which models the attacker’s knowledge. Rule OUT
corresponds to the output of a term, that is added to the frame
(and thus to the attacker’s knowledge). Rules NEW-N and
NEW-R are standard rules for restrictions; note that alpha-
renaming can always be applied to obtain the associated fresh-
ness conditions. Rules LET-THEN and LET-ELSE correspond
to the evaluation of a sequence of terms t. In case of success,
i.e. if there exists some sequence of messages u such that
u = t⇓, then variables x are bound to those messages and the
process P is executed. In case of failure, the process Q is
executed.
Rules INSERT, UPDATE-THEN and UPDATE-ELSE define
transitions for operations on the store. By definition of config-
urations, fref (P) ⊆ dom(ST ), hence get and set can only be
performed on a memory cell r after it has been created with
the rule NEW-R. Note that we require v to be a message in
rule SET whereas, in the syntax used to model protocols, we
only require that terms occurring at these positions are (not
necessarily ground) constructor terms. This difference is due
to the fact that we consider closed processes in the operational
semantics: by the time a set(r, v) is executed, all variables of v
will have been bound to messages, turning the constructor term
into a message itself.
We finally describe rules dealing with sequential composi-
tion and repetition. As in [21], we make use in rule SEQ of
a simplification relation ↝ to move sequential compositions
above most other constructs, so as to be able to execute them.
This simplification relation is defined in fig. 3. It ensures
that, whenever P is not a parallel composition, replication
or repetition, we have P ;Q ↝ R for some R that is not a
sequence. Thus sequences and repetitions are only meaningful
for this class of processes, which is limited but sufficient for
our purposes. We also consider a rule ABORT to model the
possibility for the attacker to interrupt a tag session at any
time to start a new one.
Example 5: Following Example 4 we have:(PBH;∅;∅) trÐ→ (PBH ∪ { !newnT .T{r ↦ r′}};φ0;S0)
with PBH = {!R, ! new k.new r.set(r, k).insert(k). !newnT .T},
and for arbitrary names k′ ≠ n′T , handles w0 ≠ w1 and
reference r′:
● tr = τ9.out(cT ,w0).in(cT ,w0).τthen.out(cR,w1);● φ0 = {w0 ↦ ⟨n′T ,h(k′, n′T )⟩,w1 ↦ ok};● S0 = ({r′ ↦ k′},{k′}).
D. Trace equivalence
We define here the notion of trace equivalence on which
will be based our definition of unlinkability. Intuitively, two
processes are trace equivalent if for each trace of one process,
there is an indistinguishable trace of the other process. To
define this formally, we first introduce static equivalence
between frames. Intuitively, an attacker can distinguish two
frames φ and φ′ if there exists a test that fails in φ and succeeds
in φ′ (or the contrary).
Definition 1: A frame φ is statically included in φ′ when
dom(φ) = dom(φ′) and:
● for any recipe R such that Rφ⇓ is a message, we have
that Rφ′⇓ is a message;● for any recipes R1,R2 such that R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓ are mes-
sages, and R1φ⇓ =E R2φ⇓, we have R1φ′⇓ =E R2φ′⇓.
Two frames φ and φ′ are in static equivalence, written φ ∼ φ′,
if the two static inclusions hold.
Example 6: As an illustrative example, we consider the
signature given in Example 2 and the following frames:
● φdiff = {w1 ↦ id1 ⊕ n1,w2 ↦ id2 ⊕ n2}, and● φsame = {w1 ↦ id0 ⊕ n1,w2 ↦ id0 ⊕ n2}
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IN (in(c, x).P ∪P;φ;S) in(c,R)ÐÐÐÐ→ (P{x↦ u} ∪P;φ;S)
where R is a recipe such that u = Rφ⇓ for some message u
OUT (out(c, u).P ∪P;φ;S) out(c,w)ÐÐÐÐ→ (P ∪P;φ ∪ {w ↦ u};S)
with u a message and w a fresh handle from W
NEW-N (newn.P ∪P;φ;S) τÐ→ (P ∪P;φ;S) where w.l.o.g. n /∈ fn(P, φ,S)
NEW-R (new r.P ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR)) τÐ→ (P ∪P;φ; (ST ∪ {r ↦⊥},SR)) where w.l.o.g. r /∈ dom(ST )
LET-THEN (let x = t in P else Q ∪P;φ;S) τthenÐÐ→ (P{x↦ u} ∪P;φ;S) where u = t⇓
LET-ELSE (let x = t in P else Q ∪P;φ;S) τelseÐÐ→ (Q ∪P;φ;S) when t⇓̸
GET (get(r, y).P ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR)) τÐ→ (P{y ↦ ST (r)} ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR))
SET (set(r, v).P ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR)) τÐ→ (P ∪P;φ; (ST [r ← v],SR)) with v a message
INSERT (insert(v).P ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR)) τÐ→ (P ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR ∪ {v})) with v a message
UPDATE-THEN (lookup y such that x = t, y′ = t′ in P else Q ∪P;φ; (ST ,SR))
τthenÐÐ→ (P{y ↦ v, y′ ↦ v′, x↦ w} ∪P;φ; (ST , (SR ∖ {v}) ∪ {v′}))
when v ∈ SR is such that w = t{y ↦ v}⇓ and v′ = t′{y ↦ v}⇓
UPDATE-ELSE (lookup y such that x = t, y′ = t′ in P else Q ∪P;φ;S) τelseÐÐ→ (Q ∪P;φ;S)
when for all v ∈ SR, we have that t{y ↦ v}⇓̸ or t′{y ↦ v}⇓̸
PAR ({P1 ∣ P2} ∪P;φ;S) τÐ→ ({P1, P2} ∪P;φ;S)
REPLICATION (!P ∪P;φ;S) τÐ→ (P ∪ !P ∪P;φ;S)
REPETITION ( !P ∪P;φ;S) τÐ→ ({P ; !P} ∪P;φ;S)
SEQ (P ∪P;φ;S) αÐ→ (P ′ ∪P;φ′;S ′) if P ↝ Q and (Q ∪P;φ;S) αÐ→ (P ′ ∪P;φ′;S ′)
ABORT ((P ;Q) ∪P;φ;S) τabortÐÐ→ (Q ∪P;φ;S)
Fig. 2. Semantics for processes
0;Q ↝ Q(in(c, x).P );Q ↝ in(c, x).(P ;Q) when x ∉ fv(Q)(out(c, u).P );Q ↝ out(c, u).(P ;Q)(newn.P );Q ↝ newn.(P ;Q) when n /∈ fn(Q)(new r.P );Q ↝ new r.(P ;Q) when r /∈ fref (Q)(let x = t in P ′ else P ′′);Q ↝ let x = t in (P ′;Q) else (P ′′;Q) when x ∩ fv(Q) = ∅(lookup y such that y′, x = t in P ′ else P ′′);Q ↝ lookup y such that y′, x = t in (P ′;Q) else (P ′′;Q)
when {y, y′, x} ∩ fv(Q) = ∅(insert(v).P );Q ↝ insert(v).(P ;Q)(get(r, y).P );Q ↝ get(r, y).(P ;Q) when y /∈ fv(Q)(set(r, v).P );Q ↝ set(r, v).(P ;Q)
Fig. 3. Sequence simplification rules
where n1, n2, id0, id1, id2 ∈ N . We have that φdiff ∼ φsame.
Assuming now that n1 and n2 are given to the attacker through
φ0 = {w3 ↦ n1,w4 ↦ n2}, we have that: φ0∪φsame /∼ φ0∪φdiff .
Indeed, consider R1 = w1 ⊕ w3 and R2 = w2 ⊕ w4. The test
R1
?= R2 holds in φ0 ∪ φsame whereas it does not hold in the
frame φ0 ∪ φdiff . Knowing n1 and n2, the attacker is able to
tell whether w1 and w2 are issued from the same tag.
In order to define trace equivalence, we first define
trace(K) for a configuration K = (P;φ;S):
trace(K) = { (tr, φ′) ∣ (P;φ;S) trÐ→ (P ′;φ′;S ′)
for some configuration (P ′;φ′;S ′) }.
Given a trace tr, obs(tr) is the subsequence of tr obtained
by erasing unobservable actions, i.e. τ , τabort, τthen and τelse.
Definition 2: Let K and K ′ be two configurations. We say
that K is trace included in K ′, written K ⊑K ′, when, for any(tr, φ) ∈ trace(K) there exists (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(K ′) such that
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obs(tr′) = obs(tr) and φ ∼ φ′. They are in trace equivalence,
written K ≈K ′, when K ⊑K ′ and K ′ ⊑K.
E. Our class of protocols
In this section, we formally define the class of protocols we
consider in this paper, i.e. stateful 2-party protocols where each
role is a sequence of actions, without any parallel composition.
We consider a set L of labels (denoted by `) used to decorate
output actions, in order to identify which outputs come from
a same syntactic action. We fix two channels cT ≠ cR in order
to identify the role underlying a given action.
Definition 3: A tag role manipulating reference r0 is a
closed process T obtained using the following grammar and
such that fref (T ) ⊆ {r0}:
T,T1, T2 ∶∶= 0 ∣ in(cR, x).T ∣ ` ∶ out(cT , u).T∣ let x = t in T1 else T2∣ get(r0, y).T ∣ set(r0, v).T
A reader role is a closed process R obtained from the grammar
below:
R,R1,R2 ∶∶= 0 ∣ in(cT , x).R ∣ ` ∶ out(cR, u).R∣ let x = t in R1 else R2∣ lookup y such that x = t, y′ = t′ in R1
else R2
A tag role is allowed to access its memory cell r0, whereas
a reader role manipulates the database through the lookup
construct. A protocol is then given by tag and reader roles,
together with some data to initialise their memory.
Definition 4: A protocol Π is a tuple (initT , initR, T,R)
where initT , initR are messages, T is a tag role manipulating
reference r, and R is a reader role. We assume that no output
label occurs twice in T and R. We define MΠ as(! new k.new r.set(r, initT ).insert(initR). !newnT .T )∣ (! newnR.R)
where k = fn(initT , initR), nT = fn(T ), and nR = fn(R).
The session parameters nT (resp. nR) occurring in T
(resp. R) correspond to secrets that are known only by the tag
(resp. reader) and are generated fresh for each session. This is
without loss of generality since arbitrary secrets can be shared
via the initialisation parameters initT and initR. The processMΠ corresponds to a real system using protocol Π, where an
arbitrary number of tags can be spawned. For each new tag,
fresh copies of r and k are generated to initialise the reference
and an entry is inserted in the database. Note that we consider
sequential sessions for a given tag in order to avoid concurrent
accesses to memory cells.
Example 7: Continuing Example 4, T and R correspond
respectively to tag and reader roles, up to the additon of
distinct labels `0, `1 and `2 to decorate their outputs. Then
ΠBH = (k, k, T,R) is a protocol according to our definition
and the process PBH of Example 4 is MΠBH .
III. MODELLING UNLINKABILITY
We first recall some earlier definitions of unlinkability
before giving ours and discussing how and why our definition
differs from earlier ones.
Intuitively, unlinkability attempts to express that an attacker
cannot learn anything about the relationships between several
uses of the protocols, in the spirit of the ISO definition [22].
A. Related work
a) Weak and strong unlinkability: A formal notion of
weak unlinkability has been proposed in [6] as a very general
model of unlinkability in the framework of the applied pi-
calculus. It is similar in spirit to the untraceability notion
of [32]. Intuitively, it requires that if two actions are played
by the same tag in a trace, there exists an indistinguishable
trace where the two actions are played by different tags.
In [6], another notion is introduced, strong unlinkability,
which the authors view as being unrealistically strong but
more amenable to mechanised verification. Importantly, strong
unlinkability is defined in terms of observational equivalence,
a very strong equivalence on processes whose failure often
does not correspond to attacks.
b) Taking into account the reader in the model: Bruso` et
al. [15] investigate unlinkability for a simple class of protocols.
In their model, the reader process is explicitly set to 0, which
is possible because tag roles consist of a single output. Even
in such a simple situation, this is abusive: we will illustrate
this on the OSK protocol [29] in Example 9. This protocol
is unlinkable according to [15] but we show a legitimate
linkability attack that breaks our notion of unlinkability.
c) Different ways of modelling the reader: A more
recent definition of unlinkability, introduced in [21], involves
identity-specific readers, i.e. each reader session can only in-
teract successfully with sessions of a specific tag identity. This
can be realistic for some protocols, e.g. e-passport protocols.
However, for the protocols considered here, where readers
access a global database, considering a generic reader role
makes more sense. In fact, we will show that it avoids false
attacks in Example 10.
B. Our definition of unlikability
On top of this historical buildup, we now propose a defi-
nition of unlinkability that is relevant in our context, before
discussing it in light of previous definitions.
We define unlinkability as the impossibility for an outside
observer to distinguish between two systems: the real system
where each tag can play an arbitrary number of sessions
for each identity, and an ideal system where each tag can
play only one session for each identity. We express this
indistinguishability in terms of trace equivalence.
Definition 5: Let Π = (initT , initR, T,R) be a protocol. We
define SΠ as the process obtained from MΠ by removing the
repetition operator
!
. We say that Π is unlinkable if MΠ ≈ SΠ.
Note that, even in the single session system SΠ, multiple
reader sessions may access the database entry corresponding
to a same identity.
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Example 8: Continuing Example 7, unlinkability is ex-
pressed through the following equivalence:(! new k.new r.set(r, k).insert(k). !newnT .T) ∣ !R≈ (! new k.new r.set(r, k).insert(k).newnT .T) ∣ !R
Showing that such an equivalence holds is non trivial and is
actually the main purpose of this work.
C. Comparison with previous definitions
a) Weak and strong unlinkability: It can be shown that
the weak unlinkability of [6] is strictly weaker than our
notion of unlinkability, and misses potential attacks; see Ap-
pendix A-A for details. In fact, our definition of unlinkability
is closer to the notion of strong unlinkability introduced in [6],
which the authors view as being unrealistically strong but more
amenable to mechanised verification.
In contrast, our definition relies on the more realistic notion
of trace equivalence, as is now common [21], [18]. Unlike [6],
we view our definition of unlinkability as being realistic (it
precisely captures linkability attacks) but not amenable to
verification (there are no tools for proving trace equivalences
with unbounded sessions).
b) Taking into account the reader in the model: We
illustrate with the OSK protocol [29] that our definition of
unlinkability is able to capture a legitimate linkability attack
that would be missed by the notion defined in [15].
Example 9 (OSK protocol): Let Π = (k, k, T,R) where:
T = get(r, y).set(r,hash(y)).`0 ∶ out(cT ,g(y))
R = in(cT , x).lookup y such that
xtest = TestOSK(y, x), y′ = UpdateOSK(x) in
`1 ∶ out(cR,ok) else `2 ∶ out(cR, error)
with the following infinite set of rewriting rules:● TestOSK(x,g(hashn(x)))→ ok with n ≥ 0; and● UpdateOSK(g(y))→ hash(y).
Each tag has a secret state, whose initial value is stored in
the reader’s database. The tag’s state is updated by applying
a hash function hash at each session. The reader expects a
message of the form g(hashn(x)) for some database entry
(to allow resynchronisations) and updates that entry with
hashn+1(x) (to avoid replay attacks). This step is modelled
relying on the private function symbol UpdateOSK. We ex-
plicitly model the reader’s response using public constants ok
and error: this is important because in actual access control
scenarios, one often observes the outcome of the authentication
protocol, e.g. by observing whether a door opens.
The scenario described in Figure 4 is a linkability attack
w.r.t. our definition. The first tag’s output is intercepted by the
attacker in order to be replayed after a successful interaction
between the tag and the reader. This replayed message is
not accepted by the reader because the state contained in the
message is too old. This scenario shows that it is possible
to link two sessions of a same tag: a reader replies ok after
receiving a previously intercepted message if and only if this
tag has not interacted with the reader meanwhile.
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
g(k)
r ← hash(k)
g(hash(k))
r ← hash2(k) remove k from DB
add hash2(k) in DB
ok
g(k)
error
Fig. 4. Linkability attack for OSK protocol
c) Different ways of modelling the reader: The next ex-
ample protocol is linkable in the setting of [21] but unlinkable
according to our definition.
Example 10 (Basic Hash protocol): We go back to our
running example. Since the state is never updated, it is possible
to analyse the protocol in the setting of [21]. In that setting,
readers are identity-specific, and the scenario described in
Figure 5 is a linkability attack.
k1
Tag
k1
Reader
newnT ⟨nT ,h(k1, nT )⟩
ok
⟨nT ,h(k1, nT )⟩
ok
Fig. 5. Scenario with identity-specific readers of the Basic Hash protocol
In this scenario, the attacker replays a message and observes
the answer from the reader. That answer may be ok in the
multiple sessions system, where two readers can interact with
tags of identity k1, but not in the single session system. This
scenario does not correspond to an attack when considering
generic readers that would perform a database lookup to check
the tag’s output. Our notion of unlinkability closely models
this behaviour and does not suffer from this false attack.
Therefore, for protocols that can be modelled in the setting
of [21] (i.e. protocols without updates) our notion of unlinka-
bility does not imply the one of [21]. The converse implication,
however, holds; see Appendix A-B for details. Our notion is
thus strictly weaker and, in our opinion, more realistic for the
class of protocols that we consider.
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IV. A METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING UNLINKABILITY
As already mentionned, existing tools for verifying unlinka-
bility in the unbounded case (ProVerif, Tamarin) are based on
a notion of diff-equivalence and are unable to conclude even
for very simple protocols. We illustrate this systematic issue
with our running example, the Basic Hash protocol. We have
tried to check unlinkability on this example using ProVerif
and Tamarin and in both cases, the tool has returned a trace
which does not correspond to an attack.
In ProVerif, we model the database with a table and since
the tag performs only one action (an output), we can consider
tags in parallel. Then, in order to check the equivalence given
in Example 8, we write the following bi-process:
table keys(bitstring).
let T (k:bitstring,nT:bitstring) =
out(cT,(nT,h((k,nT)))).
let R =
in(cT, x:bitstring);
get keys(k) suchthat snd(x)=h((k,fst(x))) in
out(cR,ok).
process
(! R) |
! new k:bitstring;
! new kk:bitstring; insert keys(choice[k,kk]);
new nT:bitstring; T(choice[k,kk],nT)
On the left, an arbitrary number of tags with identity k
can each play many sessions. On the right, each new session
of T is launched with a fresh identity kk, i.e. each tag plays
a single session. The tool concludes that the equivalence
“cannot be proved” and shows an attack trace. This trace
involves a reader R and two tags T (choice[k, kk]) and
T (choice[k, kk′]). Assuming that the first tag performs its
output, the bi-frame will contain:
w1 → ⟨nT ,h(choice[k, kk], nT )⟩.
Then, the reader performs an input with w1 and looks up in
the table to find a key matching the received message. On the
left side of the bi-process, the table contains the keys k at line 1
and k at line 2. On the right side of the bi-process, the table
contains the keys kk at line 1 and kk′ at line 2. Therefore, the
test will succeed on the left side independently of the chosen
line, while the test fails on the right side when the reader
looks up at line 2. This false attack relies on the incorrect
assumption that the attacker is able to identify the line of the
database that is involved in the underlying execution.
The experiments we conducted in Tamarin lead to a similar
conclusion; more details may be found in our source code [3].
We now revisit the work of [21] in the context of stateful
protocols. We define next our three conditions: frame opacity,
well-authentication and no desynchronisation. In order to do
so, we first have to introduce annotations in our semantics.
A. Annotations
We distinguish two types of actions in protocol executions:
1) τ actions are used to create new agents (rules
NEW-N, NEW-R, PAR, REPLICATION, REPETITION,
SEQ, INSERT and SET for the initialisation) and will
not be annotated;
2) other actions are performed by already created agents
(rules IN, OUT, LET-THEN, LET-ELSE, UPDATE-THEN,
UPDATE-ELSE, ABORT, GET and SET when it corre-
sponds to an action from the tag) and will be annotated
accordingly.
Considering a protocol Π, we define a set A of annotations for
identitying the protocol’s agents. A tag is annotated T (r, nT )
where r is the reference and nT the session parameters for this
tag, and a reader is annotated R(nR) where nR are the session
parameters for this reader. The goal of those annotations is to
explicitly associate each action to the agent responsible for
it. We assume that nT ≠ ∅ and nR ≠ ∅ in order to uniquely
identify agents. Note that these session nonces do not have to
be useful in the role, so the assumption is not restrictive.
We are now able to define an annotated semantics, where
agents are annotated as explained above and actions coming
from the tag/reader roles are annotated with the annotation of
the agent performing this action. We will write ta to refer to
traces of the annotated semantics.
Example 11: We go back to our running example, consid-
ering the protocol of Example 5 with a session parameter nR
added for the reader role. The multiset PBH thus becomes:{! newnR.R, ! new k.new r.set(r, k).insert(k). !newnT .T}.
The annotated version of the execution given in Example 5
yields the following annotated trace ta, where k′, n′T and n′R
are fresh names, aT = T (r′, n′T ) and aR = R(n′R):
ta = τ10.`0 ∶ out(cT ,w0)[aT ].
in(cT ,w0)[aR].τthen[aR].`1 ∶ out(cR,w1)[aR]
After the first τ actions, the annotated configuration is(PBH ∪ {RσR[aR], TσT [aT ], !newnT .T{r ↦ r′}};∅;S0)
where:
● σT = {r ↦ r′, nT ↦ n′T }; σR = {nR ↦ n′R};● S0 = ({r′ ↦ k′},{k′}).
After ta, the configuration is the same as in Example 5: no
annotation remains since all agents have terminated.
B. Frame opacity
Intuitively, this condition aims to prevent attacks in which,
for some possible behaviour of the attacker, there exists a
relation between messages that leaks information about the
involved agents. Practically speaking, this condition requires
that any reachable frame must be statically equivalent to an
idealised frame that does not depend on identity parameters.
A very simple way to obtain an idealisation of a frame
is to replace each output message by a fresh nonce. In that
case, if the real frame and the idealised frame are statically
equivalent, it is obvious that the attacker cannot learn anything
by analysing the relations between the messages, since there
is no relation between disctinct fresh nonces. Nevertheless,
it is not satisfying because too restrictive as e.g. a pair is
distinguishable from a nonce.
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We will obtain idealised frames by replacing each output
message by a message built using constructors and fresh
nonces. The precise construction will depend on the specific
output, identified by its label `. Formally, we consider a set of
name variables X n = {xn1 , xn2 , . . .} ⊆ X that will refer to fresh
names used in the idealised frame. We also assume a fixed
but arbitrary idealisation operator ideal(⋅) ∶ L ↦ T (Σc,X n).
This idealisation operator will have to be chosen as part of the
modelling such that frame opacity holds.
Definition 6: Let fr ∶ A×X n ↦ N be an injective function
mapping, for each agent, name variables to names. We define
the idealised frame Φfrideal(ta) associated to ta, as follows:{w ↦ ideal(`)σn} ∈ Φfrideal(ta) ⇔ ` ∶ out(c,w)[a] ∈ ta
where σn(xnj ) = fr(a, xnj ).
Example 12: Continuing Example 11, we consider the
following idealisation operator:
`0 ↦ ⟨xn1 , xn2⟩, `1 ↦ ok, `2 ↦ error.
Let fr be an injective function such that fr(aT , xni ) = nTi with
i ∈ {1,2}. We have Φfrideal(ta) = {w0 ↦ ⟨nT1 , nT2 ⟩,w1 ↦ ok}.
The choice of fr in Φfrideal(ta) is not important with respect
to static equivalence: we have Φfr1ideal(ta) ∼ Φfr2ideal(ta) for
any fr1 and fr2 [21]. We can thus often write Φideal(ta) instead
of Φfrideal(ta), as in the definition of frame opacity given next.
Definition 7: The protocol Π ensures frame opacity
w.r.t. the idealisation operator ideal if for any execution(MΠ;∅;S) taÐ→ (Q;φ;S ′) we have that Φideal(ta) ∼ φ.
Example 13: With the idealisation operator given in Exam-
ple 12, frame opacity holds for the Basic Hash protocol. This
can be established using the diff-equivalence of either ProVerif
or Tamarin. The intuition is that messages outputted by tags
are all different since a fresh nonce is used each time, and
an outside observer cannot distinguish a hash from a nonce.
More practical details will be given in Section VI.
As in [21], we can actually consider more complex and pow-
erful idealisation operators (see also Appendix B-C). However,
they are not needed to conclude on our case studies presented
in Section VI and we therefore chose to simplify this notion
for the sake of readability.
C. Well-authentication
The idea behind this second condition is to avoid that the
outcome of conditionals leaks information about identities to
the attacker. To do so, we require that whenever a conditional
(let or lookup) is positively evaluated, the corresponding agent
is having an honest interaction with another participant. In
practice, protocols often have some conditionals for which the
attacker already knows the outcome: these safe conditionals
can (and must) be excluded from our condition.
Definition 8: A conditional occurring in a role (tag or
reader) is said to be safe if it is of the form let x = t in P else Q
with t a sequence of T (Σpub,{x1, . . . , xn}∪ {u1, . . . , um})∗,
where the xi are the variables bound by the inputs preceding
the conditional in the role, and the ui are the messages used
in the previous outputs of that role.
In particular, a lookup conditional is never safe.
In order to state our condition, we define the notion of
honest trace. Intuitively, it corresponds to a trace in which the
attacker does not interfere, except to simply forward messages
without modifying them.
Definition 9: A trace tr is honest for a
frame φ if τelse ∉ tr and obs(tr) is of the form
out(c,w0).in(c,R0).out(c′,w1).in(c′,R1).out(c,w2) . . .
where {c, c′} = {cT , cR} and such that● each input is preceded by an output on the same channel,
and followed by an output on the other channel,● Riφ⇓ =E wiφ for any action in( ,Ri) occurring in tr.
Note that τabort is allowed in an honest trace.
Definition 10: Two annotations a and a′ have an honest
interaction in (ta, φ) if the subsequence of ta that consists of
action of the form α[a] or α[a′] is honest for φ.
We are now able to state our condition.
Definition 11: The protocol Π is well-authenticating if for
any MΠ ta.τthen[a]ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (Q;φ;S ′)
either the last action corresponds to a safe conditional of T
or R, or there exists a′ such that the annotations a and a′ have
an honest interaction in (ta, φ).
Example 14: Our running example, the Basic Hash protocol,
is actually well-authenticating. More practical details on how
we prove it will be given in Section VI. The intuition is that
the only way for an attacker to build a message that would be
accepted by the reader is to replay a tag’s output (because the
key stored in the state remains secret). Thus, for any replayed
tag’s output, there exists a (real) tag with which the reader has
an honest interaction in the considered trace.
This example also shows that well-authentication only en-
codes a weak requirement of authentication protocols, as it
allows some replay attacks.
D. No desynchronisation
This third condition states that an honest interaction between
a tag and a reader cannot fail. The intuition is that, in case
a protocol does not correctly handle the situations where the
tag and the reader are desynchronised, it could happen that
an honest interaction does not pass successfully a conditional
because of a mismatch in the states values, thus leaking some
information to the attacker.
Definition 12: The protocol Π ensures that no desynchro-
nisation occurs if, for any MΠ ta.τx[a]ÐÐÐÐ→ (P;φ;S ′) where the
last action is performed by an unsafe conditional, we have: if
there exists a′ such that a and a′ have an honest interaction
in (ta, φ) then τx = τthen.
Example 15: No desynchronisation holds for the Basic
Hash protocol: since the database and references are never
updated, an honest interaction between a tag and reader can
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only result in a τthen. We discuss further the verification of no
desynchronisation in Section VI, notably covering the case of
protocols with updates.
E. Main result
Our main result establishes that the previous three condi-
tions are sufficient to ensure unlinkability.
Theorem 1: Let Π be a protocol together with an
idealisation operator ideal(.) for it, such that:
● Π ensures frame opacity w.r.t. to ideal;● Π is well-authenticating; and● Π ensures that no desynchronisation occurs.
We have that Π satisfies unlinkability.
To establish this result, we show that any execution of MΠ
can be mimicked by an execution of SΠ leading to the same
observables. Roughly, we first show that MΠ and SΠ can
form a bi-process, putting the states apart, and then prove that
the two sides of this bi-process can evolve simultaneously:
in particular, the outcome of conditionals is the same on both
sides and frames are in static equivalence. Technically, a notion
of ground configuration [21] is used to put together MΠ
and SΠ as a bi-process. See Appendix B for details.
Let us sketch how our three conditions play a role in
showing that conditionals have the same outcome on both
sides of the bi-process. Suppose a conditional has a positive
outcome in an execution of MΠ. By well-authentication, it
must be the result of an honest interaction. Thanks to frame
opacity the relationships between recipes are still satisfied in
the execution of SΠ, and thus our honest interaction for MΠ
maps to an honest interaction for SΠ. We can finally use no
desynchronisation, which holds on SΠ, to conclude that the
outcome of the conditional will be positive in the execution
of SΠ. A similar reasoning allows us to conclude for a negative
outcome of a conditional, relying first on the no desynchro-
nisation condition for MΠ and then on well-authentication
for SΠ. Note that our two conditions are satisfied by MΠ and
thus SΠ as well since SΠ has less behaviours than MΠ.
The most striking difference between our result and the
one of [21], besides the modified definition of unlinkability, is
the introduction of the no desynchronisation condition. This
new condition is necessary to handle protocols with states: it
ensures that, in the end, the specific states of honest agents do
not impact the outcome of conditionals. There are more subtle
differences: for instance, our well-authentication condition is
more permissive than the one of [21], which features a further
constraint that becomes both useless and meaningless with our
generic readers.
In the stateless case [21], it can be shown that unlinkability
would systematically fail if expressed using bisimulation rather
than trace equivalence. When trying to mimick a multiple-
session execution on the single-session side, one has to look
forward in the trace to know which successful interactions
will actually happen. The situation is simpler in our case:
any new tag session on the multiple-session side must be
mimicked by a new identity on the single-session side, and
there is no question of which identities should be picked
by the reader sessions, as our readers are generic. As a
consequence, it should be possible to show that our conditions
actually imply a stronger notion of unlinkability where trace
equivalence is replaced by some form of bisimulation, or even
diff-equivalence. However, these equivalences would have to
be lax enough regarding states: as explained at the beginning of
this section, existing diff-equivalences cannot be used to prove
unlinkability; accordingly, the bi-processes we form in our
proof of Theorem 1 do not superpose the single- and multiple-
session states, but allow them to evolve independently.
V. TOWARDS AUTOMATION
Existing tools at our disposal for verifying our sufficient
conditions in the unbounded case are ProVerif [12], [1] and
Tamarin [10], [2]. In order to analyse our protocols of interest,
we need a tool that supports stateful protocols. Handling global
states is a known limitation of ProVerif. Our attempts to
use private channels to model memory cells have resulted
in non-termination issues. We have also experimented the
recent extension GSVerif [17], but failed again due to non-
termination [3].
On the other hand, Tamarin is naturally well-suited to
handle global states. Morever, unlike ProVerif, it supports the
XOR operator and provides an interactive mode that can be
used to complete the more difficult proofs. We thus chose
Tamarin to verify unlinkability of stateful protocols with our
method. Despite all these qualities, obtaining satisfying results
with Tamarin has required significant effort. We explain here
the main choices we made about how to encode the protocols
and our conditions.
A. Tamarin in a nutshell
We give here a brief introduction to the main features
of Tamarin, referring the reader to [2] for more details.
In Tamarin, security protocols and attackers are modelled
symbolically using multiset rewriting: a state of the system
is a multiset of facts, and transitions between states are given
by rules of the form l −[a]→ r where l and r are sequences
of facts and a is a sequence of labels. There are two types
of facts: linear facts are consumed by a rule while persistent
facts (written !F) can be consumed arbitrarily often, i.e. they
are never removed from the state once introduced.
Trace properties are expressed in a fragment of first-order
logic over labels, messages and timepoints. These formulas
are used as lemma statements to verify trace properties of the
modelled protocol. Lemmas may be proved automatically or
using an interactive mode where the user can manually guide
and inspect the proof. Some lemmas can be re-used as helpers
in the next proofs. Finally, the tool provides restrictions,
which are logical formulas constraining the set of traces to
be considered in the analysis.
In order to prove observational equivalence between two
transition systems, the two systems should be superposed into
a single model containing the diff operator, allowing different
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messages for the two systems but a shared structure for the
states and the transitions.
B. Well-authentication and no desynchronisation
We check well-authentication and no desynchronisation
within the same Tamarin file, i.e. using the same model of the
studied protocol. We comment on this shared model, before
discussing the encodings of our two conditions as lemmas.
For illustration purposes, we show next the model for our
running example, the Basic Hash protocol. We will give some
details about this implementation later on.
theory BasicHash_WA_ND
begin
functions: h/1, OK/0
/*************************************
PROTOCOL
*************************************/
rule InitReader:
[ Fr(˜sidR) ]
--[ NewReaderSession(˜sidR) ]->
[ Reader(˜sidR) ]
rule InitTagId:
[ Fr(˜k) ]
--[ NewId(˜k), InsertDB(˜k) ]->
[ !DB(˜k), !TagSession(˜k) ]
rule InitTagSession:
[ !TagSession(˜kT), Fr(˜sidT) ]
--[ NewTagSession(˜sidT,˜kT) ]->
[ Tag(˜sidT,˜kT) ]
/* READER */
rule R_in:
[ Reader(˜sidR), In(x) ]
--[ InR(˜sidR,x) ]->
[ Reader1(˜sidR,x) ]
rule R_test:
let x = <xnT,h(<kR,xnT>)> in
[ !DB(kR), Reader1(˜sidR,x) ]
--[ TestR(˜sidR), CompleteR(˜sidR) ]->
[ Out(OK) ]
/* TAG */
rule T_out:
let m = <˜nT,h(<kT,˜nT>)> in
[ Tag(˜sidT,kT), Fr(˜nT) ]
--[ PlayT(˜sidT,kT), OutT(˜sidT,kT,˜nT,m),
CompleteT(˜sidT) ]->
[ Out(m) ]
This model contains a few elements that are not strictly
necessary for illustrating the encoding of our conditions, but
which we systematically use in our models and thus take the
opportunity to present here. First, the sidT and sidR nonces
are added to all tag and reader roles as identifiers, even though
in this case nT could have been used to identify tags. Second,
the CompleteT and CompleteR labels are used in sanity
check lemmas (not shown here) to verify that our models can
execute properly. Finally, the PlayT label would be useful
to impose sequentiality on tag sessions using a restriction, for
protocols where tags perform more than a single output.
To model sequentiality of a tag’s successive sessions, we use
restrictions. More specifically, the transition rules modelling
our protocols allow many sessions of a given tag to run in
parallel but we then use restrictions to specify the set of
traces that Tamarin should actually consider when proving
our conditions, notably imposing sequentiality of a tag’s
sessions. This has proved to be helpful for the tool to conclude
automatically, instead of encoding directly the sequentiality in
the protocol’s workflow. Concretely, the sequential restriction
is written as follows, building on the systematic use of the
PlayT label in tag rules:
restriction seqSessionTag:
"not (Ex sidT1 sidT2 kT #i1 #i2 #i3.
PlayT(sidT1,kT)@i1 &
PlayT(sidT2,kT)@i2 &
PlayT(sidT1,kT)@i3 &
i1<i2 & i2<i3 &
not(sidT1=sidT2))"
We model the presence of a message x in the database
by a fact DB(x). When the reader performs a lookup in
the database, we consume the fact DB(x) that verifies the
conditional and we create a new fact DB(x′) where x′ is the
updated value of the state. When working with monotonic
states (i.e. never updated), it has proved useful to use persistent
facts !DB(x).
Our Tamarin files also feature intermediate lemmas express-
ing invariants of the protocol or secrecy of some data, marking
them as reusable to guide our proofs.
We pointed out in Section III-C that modelling error mes-
sages is important when verifying unlinkability because the
outcome of conditionals is often observable in real uses of
authentication protocols. However, error messages are not
always represented in our Tamarin models. Indeed, encod-
ing else branches with Tamarin is not straightforward when
dealing with facts DB(x) representing the database, and it
is actually not necessary when verifying well-authentication
and no desynchronisation (else branches do not contribute
to the attacker’s knowledge, and are not involved in honest
executions).
a) Well-authentication: The way we encode this condi-
tion is very similar to what is done in [21] and Tamarin is
well suited to write such lemmas. Basically, we check that,
for each successful conditional of a given agent, the trace
contains an honest interaction of this agent with another agent
of the opposite role (i.e. an alternation of inputs and outputs
where each input is equal modulo the equational theory to the
previous output).
For our model of the Basic Hash protocol, well-
authentication is expressed through the following lemma.
lemma WA_Reader [use_induction]:
"All sidR #i3.
TestR(sidR)@i3 ==>
( Ex sidT kT nT m #i1 #i2.
( InR(sidR,m)@i2 &
OutT(sidT,kT,nT,m)@i1 &
i1<i2 & i2<i3 ))"
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b) No desynchronisation: Encoding this condition is
more subtle than well-authentication but the flexibility allowed
by Tamarin to write lemmas is helpful. We verify that, when-
ever an agent has reached a point where a conditional is going
to be evaluated, if this agent is having an honest interaction
with another agent of the opposite role, then the conditional
will be positively evaluated. The way we encode that the
conditional will be positively evaluated changes depending on
the type of conditional. For let conditionals, we only have to
check that the test holds: it generally consists in checking that
a message is of the expected form. The same holds for lookup
conditionals in the case of a protocol where the database is
monotonic: if the test holds at some point in time, it will
hold at any future point since the database is never updated;
the only difference is that the test will involve database facts.
When the database is updated, verifying no desynchronisation
for lookup conditionals is more involved: we must check that
the test will hold at any point in the future. It generally consists
in checking that a message is of the expected form, that some
appropriate database entry has been inserted in the database,
and that it would still be there in the future when the test
might be evaluated.
The encoding of the no desynchronisation condition for our
Basic Hash model (for which the database is monotonic) is as
follows:
lemma ND_Reader [use_induction]:
"All sidT kT nT sidR m #i1 #i2.
(InR(sidR,m)@i2 &
OutT(sidT,kT,nT,m)@i1 &
i1<i2)
==>
(Ex kR xnT #i0.
m = <xnT,h(<kR,xnT>)> &
InsertDB(kR)@i0 &
i0<i2)"
C. Frame opacity
Similarly to [21], we check frame opacity using a notion of
diff-equivalence. We adapt the encoding of [21] which uses
the diff-equivalence feature of ProVerif, in order to use the
observational equivalence mode of Tamarin. In this mode, we
write bi-systems, i.e. systems that only differ in terms using the
diff operator. In the case of frame opacity, the left-hand side
system encodes the real execution and, in the right-hand side
system, we replace each outputted message by its idealisation.
If Tamarin proves that these two systems are equivalent, then
we have that the resulting frames are in static equivalence so
frame opacity holds.
Frame opacity is defined w.r.t. an idealisation operator. In
our case studies, we use an idealisation that maps hashes and
encryptions to fresh nonces, public constants to themselves,
and pairs of terms to pairs of the terms’ idealisations.
The main problem is that conditionals lose their meaning
on the right-hand side of the bi-system: the conditions are
meant for the real messages, not their idealisations. To avoid
this mismatch, which would break diff-equivalence, we over-
approximate the protocol by removing the conditionals. We
thus verify that frame opacity holds for a larger set of possible
traces, which is sound.
For some case studies, conditionals are used to define new
variables that are used later on. When removing the condi-
tionals, we thus lose the definition of these variables. In order
to overcome this difficulty, we enrich the equational theory.
Consider for example an input x equal to senc(n, k) in the
real frame and equal to a fresh nonce n′ in the idealised frame.
In order to recover n without using a conditional in the real
execution (left-hand side system) we introduce a private con-
structor extract with the equation extract(senc(y, z), z) = y.
Then extract(x) will reduce to n in the left-hand side system,
and will not fail in the right-hand side system since extract is
not a destructor symbol.
Over-approximating the protocol as explained above has
sometimes not been sufficient to make Tamarin conclude. For
some case studies, we have used open variables, i.e. inputs that
the attacker can fill with any value, including the real values.
But here again, it is sound to check frame opacity on a set of
traces that is larger than the actual traces of the protocol.
In order to verify frame opacity for the Basic Hash protocol,
we use the observational equivalence mode on a modified
model, where the reader’s test is removed and the output of the
tag is a diff-term. The model is thus identical to the previous
one except for two rules:
rule R_test:
// let x = <xnT,h(<kR,xnT>)> in
[ !DB(kR), Reader1(˜sidR,x) ]
--[ TestR(˜sidR), CompleteR(˜sidR) ]->
[ Out(OK) ]
rule T_out:
let m = diff(<˜nT,h(<kT,˜nT>)>,<˜nId1,˜nId2>) in
[ Tag(˜sidT,kT), Fr(˜nT), Fr(˜nId1), Fr(˜nId2) ]
--[ PlayT(˜sidT,kT), OutT(˜sidT,kT,˜nT,m),
CompleteT(˜sidT) ]->
[ Out(m) ]
VI. CASE STUDIES
We have applied our method to several case studies. Our
results are summarised in Figure 6, descriptions of the pro-
tocols are available in Appendix C, and the Tamarin files to
reproduce these results can be found at [3]. We have found
two attacks on unlinkability for the OSK and LAK protocols
that had not been previously reported in the literature, and
propose fixes that we prove unlinkable using our method.
For a few cases, we have used the interactive mode of
Tamarin to conclude. In most cases, Tamarin is able to
conclude automatically in a few seconds (the worst cases
take about one minute). But it has required a lot of time
to implement these case studies and to write appropriate
intermediate lemmas in such a way that Tamarin can prove
automatically our conditions.
A. Basic Hash, Hash-Lock and Feldhofer
We study here three examples falling into our class of
protocols and being similar in the sense that they involve a
monotonic state (i.e. never updated). Our sufficient conditions
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Unlink. WA FO ND
Basic Hash ok 3 3 3
Hash-Lock ok 3 3 3
Feldhofer ok 3 3 3
OSK (v1) attack 3* 7
OSK (v2) ok 3 3 3
LAK (pairs) attack 3* 7
LAK (pairs, fix v1) ok 3 3 3
LAK (pairs, fix v2) ok 3* 3 3
5G-AKA (simplified) ok 3 3 3
Fig. 6. Summary of case studies: 3 means the condition hold, 7 means the
conditions does not hold. These conditions are verified automatically with
Tamarin, except for those with a * meaning the interactive mode has been
used.
can be automatically verified with Tamarin, thus we conclude
that these protocols ensure unlinkability.
Our conclusions regarding these three protocols are in line
with the literature. Note that if the Basic Hash protocol had
been studied in [21], it would have been declared linkable for
the reason we detailed in Section III-C. In [10], the Feldhofer
protocol is analysed using the observational equivalence mode
of Tamarin but for a notion of privacy that is different from
our definition of unlinkability.
B. OSK
The OSK protocol is proved unlinkable in [15] but in a
simplified model, as explained in Section III-C. A privacy vul-
nerability in the OSK protocol is highlighted in [23], but this
attack exploits an upper bound on the number of operations
in the tag’s lifetime, which is a practical consideration that we
do not consider here. We present here two versions inspired
from the original description of the OSK protocol that can be
found in [29].
The first version (v1) is the one described in Example 9
for which we highlight an attack scenario. On this version,
Tamarin concludes automatically that our no desynchronisa-
tion condition does not hold.
The second version (v2) differs only in the reader’s
conditional. Instead of expecting a message of the form
g(hashn(x)) for some database entry x (to allow resynchro-
nisations) and updating that entry with hashn+1(x) (to avoid
replay attacks), the reader never updates the database and
accepts any message of the form g(hashn(k)) for some initial
shared key k. In this second version, an attacker can replay
a message but this is not an issue for unlinkability. Indeed,
Tamarin is able to prove that our three conditions hold.
In order to check frame opacity on OSK v2, we do not
simply remove the reader’s conditional as explained in Sec-
tion V-B but we also over-approximate the protocol workflow.
Since the reader’s conditional is removed, this role becomes
useless in the sense that it only outputs a public constant that
stays the same in the idealised frame. We can thus remove
all reader rules without affecting diff-equivalence. We also
over-approximate the possible values for the tags’ states, by
allowing the attacker to choose them. Over-approximating the
protocol in such a way helps Tamarin to terminate. Since diff-
equivalence holds for a larger set of traces (containing the real
ones) we conclude that frame opacity holds.
In our Tamarin models, we represent the successive ap-
plications of the same hash functions by using a multiset
of the constant 1. For example, we represent hash3(x) with
hash(x,1+1+1). This allows us to express conditions such as∃m ≤ n. x = hm(k), but has an impact on the attacker model.
This is why we have added an extra rule to represent the fact
that the attacker can obtain hashn+1(x) from hashn(x).
C. LAK
The LAK protocol as described in [33] is a stateful protocol
using the XOR operator. As highlighted in [21], this protocol
suffers from an authentication attack (based on algebraic
properties of the XOR operator) which can be turned into
an attack on unlinkability. An analysis of unlinkability for the
LAK protocol using Tamarin is done in [19] but only for a
bounded number of sessions, and this same attack is found.
In [21], a stateless version of this protocol where the
XOR operator is replaced by the pairing operator was proved
unlinkable. The three different versions of the LAK protocol
we study here also replace the XOR operator by pairs.
We first analyse a version of the protocol that is very close
to the original one: the only difference is the replacement of
the XOR operator by the pairing operator, i.e. the way tags
and readers update their states is faithful to the description
in [33]. We show that this version suffers from an attack on
unlinkability, based on the fact that there exists a scenario
in which a tag can be desynchronised w.r.t. the states stored
in the database, thus leaking information to the attacker. This
scenario is depicted in Figure 15 of Appendix C. As expected,
our no desynchronisation condition fails; Tamarin is able to
automatically find an attack trace.
Then, we propose two possible fixes to correct this flaw
(fix v1 and fix v2 in Figure 6). Our first fix is the stateless
version as proposed in [21] but with generic readers having
access to a common database, which is closer to the original
specification. Our second fix consists in modifying the reader’s
conditional: for a given value ⟨k0, n⟩ in the database, the reader
will accept any message containing hkeyp(k0) with p ≤ n,
instead of accepting only hkeyn(k0) or hkeyn−1(k0). Thus,
our fix handles unbounded desynchronisations, whereas the
original specification only handled desynchronisation by one
step. Note that, even if this second fix is more complex than the
first one, a protocol where states are updated at each session
is interesting when considering properties such as forward
privacy. Using Tamarin to check our three conditions, we
conclude that these two fixes ensure unlinkability.
Our models in Tamarin use two different hash functions: a
function h for the messages and another one, hkey, for the key
updates. Similarly to the OSK protocol, we also represent the
successive applications of the same hash functions by using a
multiset of the constant 1 and we use the same extra rule to
complement the attacker’s capacities.
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The fixed version v2 required more work to automatically
verify our conditions. Lemmas checking no desynchronisation
are more complex to write since we are in the case where
states in the database are updated, and proving them required
more intermediate lemmas than in other cases.
D. Simplified 5G-AKA
The AKA protocol, designed by the 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) which is responsible for the standardi-
sation of 3G, 4G and 5G technologies, aims at authenticating a
subscriber to its service provider and establishing shared keys
for future communications.
A number of linkability attacks (resp. fixes) have been
shown (resp. proposed) in the literature [7], [20], [24], [13].
We study here a simplified version of the AKA protocol, in-
spired from the different fixes proposed in the literature. More
specifically, we add a challenge-response mechanism at the
beginning of the protocol to avoid the encrypted IMSI replay
attack [20]. With this modification, we add the generation
of fresh nonces for the network and the mobile station, thus
the resynchronisation mechanism using the sequence number
becomes useless and we remove this sequence number, which
takes away the main difficulty of the original protocol. In the
end, we have a stateful protocol with monotonic states (i.e.
never updated) for which we are able to prove, using Tamarin,
that our three conditions hold. We conclude that this simplified
version of the protocol ensures unlinkability.
VII. LIMITATIONS
We discuss in this section a number of limitations of
our work. Obvious ones include the restriction to two-party
protocols and the assumption that tags and readers are not
corrupted. We believe that the first restriction could be lifted
relatively easily, but do not know of case studies that would
be enabled in this way. Concerning corruption, it would be
interesting to incorporate it in our notion of unlinkability: we
leave it for future work. We discuss below the other limitations
concerning the method and its mechanisation.
A. Method
Our approach based on sufficient conditions is not complete:
there are protocols that are unlinkable but do not satisfy
our conditions. In particular, our conditions impose that the
outcome of conditionals is the same in the real world (multiple
sessions) and in the ideal one (single session), but one can
easily design a toy protocol that is unlinkable but does not
verify such a property. However, we are not aware of practical
cases where this source of incompleteness is an issue.
Our Definition 9 of an honest trace is arbitrary and might be
too restrictive for some protocols. This can be seen by taking
any protocol proved unlinkable with our method, and adding
a simple exchange at the beginning of the protocol, that does
not break unlinkability: the tag’s session starts by receiving a
public constant get challenge sent by the reader. The expected
interaction would thus be as follows:
R ∶ out(cR,get challenge)
T ∶ in(cR,get challenge)
But the following one is also possible, since get challenge is
public and thus derivable by the attacker:
T ∶ in(cR,get challenge)
R ∶ out(cR,get challenge)
Our well-authentication condition would not hold anymore
due to this possible (benign) interaction, because honest traces
require that each input is preceded by its corresponding output.
We believe that such examples could be avoided by adopting
a richer notion of honest trace. We believe that our theoretical
results can be adapted, as long as both well-authentication and
no desynchronisation use the same notion of honest trace (this
is indeed a key element for the proof of our main result).
B. Mechanisation
Regarding the mechanisation of our method, we hope to see
further improvements of verification tools (Tamarin or new
ones) that would help users to verify our conditions in more
cases and with less effort. We discuss below two points that
are particularly important in that respect.
Many protocols falling in the scope of this paper use the
XOR operator, but we were not able to apply our method to
these protocols because the support for the XOR operator in
Tamarin is not yet sufficient. As an example, Tamarin does
not terminate on the simple static equivalence illustrated in
Example 6 (see [3] for the code). It seems to us that improving
Tamarin’s XOR support is necessary to be able to apply our
method to protocols using XOR.
Another aspect which limits the mechanisation of our
method is the lack of more inductive reasoning in Tamarin.
Using inductive proof methods is helpful when dealing with
protocols with mutable states, but it is currently only available
for proving trace properties and not in observational equiv-
alence mode. We encountered non-termination issues when
checking frame opacity for protocols where the states are up-
dated. We overcame this difficulty by significantly simplifying
the protocol’s workflow, as explained in Section V: this is not
an issue for soundness, but limiting this non-trivial manual
step would be a key to further automate our method.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have adapted the method of [21] to verify unlinkabil-
ity for stateful protocols. We have proposed a definition of
unlinkability that is well-suited to such protocols, improving
on earlier propositions. We have adapted the two conditions
originally proposed in [21], identified a third, no desynchroni-
sation condition, and proved that these three conditions imply
unlinkability. This provides a method to verify unlinkability
for an unbounded number of sessions, which we have applied
on several case studies using Tamarin. We have thus found
new attacks and obtained new proofs of unlinkability.
A way to go further would be to bridge the gap between
the formal model of Tamarin, based on multiset rewriting, and
our formal model based on the applied-pi calculus, which is
better suited to our theoretical developments relying e.g. on the
notions of conditionals and honest execution. For this purpose,
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we could use a tool such as SAPIC [25]. It would allow us
to describe our protocols in a language close to the applied-
pi calculus while still using, after an automatic translation
step, the Tamarin language to express and verify conditions.
A potential drawback of this approach is that the generated
code might not be satisfying: currently, several details of our
manual encodings are crucial to obtain automatic proofs; these
design choices would have to be systematised.
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APPENDIX A
DISCUSSION ON UNLINKABILITY
A. Comparing with weak and strong unlinkability
Intuitively, weak unlinkability [6] requires that, for any two
observable tag actions in an annotated trace, there exists an
indistinguishable trace where the corresponding actions either
belong to the same session or to different identities. In other
words, just looking at these two actions, it could be that they
originate from a single session scenario.
We reformulate the formal definition of weak unlinkability
[6, Definition 11] in our setting, adapting it to our framework
and specialising it for tag unlinkability but preserving its
essence. In this definition, tai denotes the ith observable action
in an annotated trace ta.
Definition 13 (Weak unlinkability): A protocol Π ensures
weak unlinkability for its tags when:
● for any annotated trace ta and any executionMΠ taÐ→ (P;φ;S),● for any i, j such that tai and taj carry tag annotations,● there exists an annotated trace ta′ and an executionMΠ ta′Ð→ (P ′;φ′;S ′) such that obs(ta) = obs(ta′) and
φ ∼ φ′ and● ta′i and ta′j carry tag annotations corresponding either to
a same session or to different identities, i.e. ta′i and ta′j
are either the same tag annotation or two annotations of
the form T (r, nT ) and T (r′, n′T ).
Assuming that the attacker can tell, for each observable
action, the role from which it originates, we can easily show
that our notion of unlinkability implies weak unlinkability.
Proposition 1: Let Π be a protocol (according to Defini-
tion 4). If MΠ ≈ SΠ, then Π ensures weak unlinkability for
its tags.
Proof. Consider a trace ta and positions i and j as in Def-
inition 13. By MΠ ≈ SΠ we have an annotated trace ta′ that
can be executed by SΠ, leading to an indistinguishable frame.
By our assumption on Π, and because obs(ta′) = obs(ta), ta′i
and ta′j still carry tag annotations. Finally, by definition of SΠ,
these tag annotations either belong to the same session or to
two distinct identities. ◻
The converse implication does not hold, as shown by the
next example, where we use some obvious syntactic sugar for
computing disjunctions in a test.
Example 16: Consider a protocol Π = (i,ok, T,R) with the
following role processes, where k is a private constant, and i
and n are names respectively encoding a tag identity and a
tag session nonce:
T ∶= get(r, y).out(cT ,{y, n}k)
R ∶= in(cT , x).in(cT , y).in(cT , z).
if fst(dec(x, k)) = fst(dec(y, k))
or fst(dec(z, k)) = fst(dec(x, k))
or fst(dec(y, k)) = fst(dec(z, k)) then
out(cR,ok)
With this protocol, the attacker can use the reader to test
whether two tag outputs out of three correspond to the same
identity. However, he cannot tell which two outputs correspond
to the same identity. Because the output ok on cR can be
observed with MΠ but not with SΠ, we have MΠ /≈ SΠ. But
Π ensures weak unlinkability, as shown next.
Consider a trace ta where tai and taj carry tag annotations
corresponding to distinct sessions of the same identity i0.
Note that, since all tag outputs are randomised with a nonce,
and since k remains secret, the frame is equivalent to one
where each handle maps to a fresh name. In particular,
renaming identities in the frame keeps it statically equivalent.
To conclude that weak unlinkability holds, we choose to map
all identities to i0 except the one associated to tai. Doing so
we preserve the executability of reader tests, and thus outputs,
because there are only two distinct identities involved.
This example is of course extremely artificial; we kept it
simple to focus on the key idea. It is also obviously outside
the class of protocols that our method can meaningfully
analyse: specifically, the notions of honest interaction and
well-authentication are not adequate here. We believe it should
be possible to adapt our counter-example into one that involves
only two-party interactions, but that is not the point of this
discussion.
Importantly, we claim that Example 16 shows not only
a gap between two definitions, but also an actual attack on
unlinkability that is not captured by weak unlinkability. More
precisely, it violates the requirement that the attacker should
not learn anything about the relationship between sessions
(here, the reader learns that at least two sessions among three
correspond to the same identity) although it does not contradict
the simpler informal notion of unlinkability that only requires
that the attacker cannot tell if two sessions are related. In our
view, the generalised form of unlinkability is important, since
any information leakage could be used to track people. With
our example protocol, if the attacker controlled one honest tag,
it would be able to tell when two sessions correspond to the
same identity.
B. Comparison with unlinkability of [21]
Consider a protocol Π in the sense of [21] where the
tag and reader roles are given by processes T and R, with
identity parameters k and session parameters nT ⊔nR such that
fn(T ) ⊆ nT ⊔k and fn(R) ⊆ nR ⊔k. It does not matter which
of T and R is the initiator role. Given the class of protocols
that we consider in this paper, we restrict our attention to the
case where tag sessions are played sequentially and reader
sessions are played concurrently. We also assume that identity
parameters are shared by the tag and reader roles, i.e. we are
in the so-called shared case of [21] where k ∩ fn(T ) ≠ ∅ and
k ∩ fn(R) ≠ ∅.
From Π we construct a protocol according to our definition.
Relying on some obvious syntactic sugar for translating a tuple
into a sequence and conversely, we define Π′ = (k, k, T ′,R′)
with the role processes defined as follows:● T ′ = get(r, y).T{k ↦ y};
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● R′ = lookup y such that x = ok, y′ = y in R{k ↦ y}.
In other words, each identity k is stored both in the
corresponding tag state and in the global reader database.
These values will only be read but never modified. The tag
process reads the names k from r. After that, it will behave
like T . The reader process R′ chooses non-deterministically
an identity k and becomes the process R where the identity
parameters are instantiated accordingly. Note that fn(T ′) ⊆ nT
and fn(R′) ⊆ nR.
In [21], the unlinkability of Π is defined as the trace
equivalence M ≈ S where:M = ! new k.(( !newnT .T ) ∣ (!newnR.R))S = ! new k.((newnT .T ) ∣ (newnR.R))
Proposition 2: In the shared case, unlinkability of [21] im-
plies our notion of unlinkability: M ≈ S implies MΠ′ ≈ SΠ′ .
Proof. We first observe that M ≈ MΠ′ . Indeed, the only
difference between the two processes is in the way one obtains
instances of tag and reader processes: in M they are directly
spawned by possibly replicating the outermost ! and creating
a new identity k, then creating an instance of the tag or
reader process with the desired session parameters; in MΠ′
the processes T ′ or R′ are first instanciated with session
parameters, before reading their identity parameters k from the
memory cell or database. Thus, for any trace (ta, φ) of M we
have a trace (ta′, φ) of MΠ′ with obs(ta) = obs(ta′): it suf-
fices to add τ actions corresponding to memory accesses, and
modify τ actions corresponding to replications and sequences.
Similarly, for any trace (ta′, φ) of MΠ′ there exists a trace(ta, φ) of M with obs(ta) = obs(ta′).
We also have S ⊑ SΠ′ , for the same reasons as above. The
converse does not hold, because traces of SΠ′ may feature
several reader sessions with the same identity parameters,
which cannot be mimicked by S .
Hence, assuming M ≈ S we have MΠ′ ≈ M ≈ S ⊑ SΠ′ .
The converse inclusion SΠ′ ⊑ MΠ′ is immediate, thus our
notion of unlinkability holds. ◻
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF OUR MAIN RESULT
We provide in this appendix the proof of our main result
(Theorem 1) that we recall here.
Theorem 1: Let Π be a protocol together with an
idealisation operator ideal(.) for it, such that:
● Π ensures frame opacity w.r.t. to ideal;● Π is well-authenticating; and● Π ensures that no desynchronisation occurs.
We have that Π satisfies unlinkability.
The goal is to prove that MΠ ⊑ SΠ, since the other direction
is trivial. The argument follows the same general structure
as for the theorem of [21]; we recall it and highlight key
differences.
We fix a protocol Π = (initT , initR, T,R), and we denote
k = fn(initT )∪ fn(initR). For any execution of MΠ, we will
show that there exists an indistinguishable execution of SΠ.
Essentially, we will apply a renaming of agents involved in the
given execution of MΠ to map this multiple-session execution
to a single-session execution. We will then show that this
renaming preserves the executability and that the frames before
and after the renaming are statically indistinguishable.
A. Abstraction of configurations
In order to facilitate the development of the proof, we will
work with an abstraction of configurations that we call ground
configurations. We will associate to any execution of MΠ
and SΠ a ground configuration containing all involved agents
already correctly instantiated. These ground configurations are
obtained from well-formed sequences of annotations, which
we define below.
Definition 14: A sequence Sa of annotations is well-formed
if the following conditions hold.
● In all annotations T (r, nT ) and R(nR), the session
parameters nT and nR are names from N such that
nT ∩ nR = ∅ and r is a reference from R.● Two different annotations never share a session parameter.
Definition 15: We say that a well-formed sequence Sa
of annotations is single-session if for all tag annotations
T (r, nT 1) and T (r, nT 2) in Sa sharing the same reference r,
we have that nT 1 = nT 2.
We lift those definitions to annotated traces, by only keeping
the annotations appearing in the trace. We then have that an
annotated trace obtained from an execution of MΠ (resp. SΠ)
is well-formed (resp. well-formed and single-session).
To define ground configurations, we make use of the fol-
lowing notations, where Sa is a well-formed sequence of
annotations:
● paramR(Sa) = {nR ∣ R(nR) ∈ Sa} is the set of session
parameters for the reader role in Sa;● ref(Sa) = {r ∣ T (r, nT ) ∈ Sa} is the set of references
appearing in the annotations of the tag role in Sa;● for each r ∈ ref(Sa), paramseqT (Sa, r) is the sequence
of session parameters for the tag role associated to a
reference r in Sa, without repetition and in order of first
occurrence in Sa;● for each r ∈ ref(Sa), we assume a sequence of
names kr having the same length as k and such that kr
does not contain any name occurring in paramR(Sa),
paramseqT (Sa, r′) or kr′ , for any r′ ≠ r.
Given a sequence s = (ei)i∈[1;n], we write ∐e∈s P (e) for
P (e1); (P (e2); (. . . ;P (en) . . .)).
Definition 16: Let Sa be a well-formed sequence of anno-
tations. The ground configuration associated to Sa, denoted
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by K(Sa), is the configuration (PT ⊔PR;∅; (ST ,SR)) wherePT , PR, ST and SR are defined as follows:PT = {∐n′T ∈paramseqT (Sa,r′) T{r ↦ r′, nT ↦ n′T }[T (r′, n′T )]∣ r′ ∈ ref(Sa)}PR = {R{nR ↦ n′R}[R(n′R)] ∣ n′R ∈ paramR(Sa)}ST = {r ↦ initT {k ↦ kr} ∣ r ∈ ref(Sa)}SR = {initR{k ↦ kr} ∣ r ∈ ref(Sa)}
We lift these definitions to annotated traces as before,
allowing us to define a ground configuration K(ta) from a
well-formed annotated trace ta. We can then establish precise
connections between the executions of MΠ or SΠ and those
of the associated ground configurations.
Proposition 3: Let ta be a well-formed annotated trace.
(1) If MΠ taÔ⇒K (resp. SΠ taÔ⇒K), then K(ta) taÔ⇒K ′ for
some K ′ such that φ(K) ∼ φ(K ′).
(2) If K(ta) taÔ⇒ K, then MΠ taÔ⇒ K ′ for some K ′ such
that φ(K) = φ(K ′).
(3) If K(ta) taÔ⇒K and ta is single-session, then SΠ taÔ⇒K ′
for some K ′ such that φ(K) = φ(K ′).
(4) If ta = ta1.ta2 and K(ta1.ta2) ta1Ð→ K then K(ta1) ta1Ð→
K ′ for some K ′ such that φ(K) = φ(K ′).
Proof.
(1) The operator K(⋅) mimicks how MΠ and SΠ create
agents: if an agent is available in the execution ofMΠ orSΠ then the same agent is also available in the execution
of K(ta). In particular, the SET and INSERT rules used
to initialise the store in MΠ or SΠ before the creation
of agents are replaced in K(ta) by the initialisation
of the store before starting the execution, up to a
renaming: if initT {k ↦ k′} and initR{k ↦ k′} are used
when initializing a tag T (r, n), then K(ta) will haveST (r) = initT {k ↦ kr} and initR{k ↦ kr} ∈ SR. This
alpha-equivalence will be maintained not only between
the stores but also the annotated processes of our two
executions. In particular the resulting frames will be
alpha-equivalent, hence statically equivalent.
(2) This item relies on the fact that the memory cells and
the database are initialised with fresh alpha-renamings
of the initialisation parameters of the protocol: the same
parameters can be chosen when creating agents in MΠ.
(3) This item is similar to item (2), adding the single-session
hypothesis to justify that we never need to create two
tag sessions with the same identity.
(4) This item relies on the fact that extra processes and
references from ta2 are unused when executing ta1. ◻
B. Renaming
As mentionned before, we will use a renaming of annota-
tions to show that, for any execution of MΠ, there exists an
indistinguishable execution of SΠ. We give below a generic
definition of such renamings of annotations.
Definition 17: A renaming of annotations (denoted by ρ)
is an injective mapping from annotations to annotations such
that:
● for any well-formed sequence of annotations Sa, the
sequence Saρ is well-formed and single session;● ρ is role-preserving, i.e. tag (resp. reader) annotations are
mapped to tag (resp. reader) annotations.
We define taρ as the annotated trace obtained from ta by
applying ρ to annotations only. We can also define the effect
of renaming on ground configurations. To that end, we first
define the renaming on names induced by the renaming on
annotations.
a) Renaming on names induced by the renaming on an-
notations: Given a renaming ρ on annotations, we can define
a renaming σ (induced by ρ on a particular annotation A) that
applies on names and references for this annotation A.
● If A = T (r, nT ) and ρ(A) = T (r′, n′T ) then σ is such
that rσ = r′ and nTσ = n′T ;● If A = R(nR) and ρ(A) = R(n′R) then σ is such that
nRσ = n′R.
Renaming on names induced by a renaming of annotations
may conflict. For example, when ρ(T (r, nT )) = T (r1, nT )
and ρ(T (r, n′T )) = T (r2, n′T ), the two induced renamings
map r to r1 and r2 respectively.
b) Renaming on ground configurations: Consider
a ground configuration K = (P;∅; (ST ,SR)) whereP = {∐j P ij [aij]}i, ST = {rk ↦ vT k}k and SR = {vRl}l.
We note ref(K,ρ) the set of all references appearing in the
renamed annotations ρ(aij). We also assume vectors kr as in
Section B-A. We define Kρ = (P ′;∅; (S ′T ,S ′R)) where:● P ′ = {∐j P ijσij[ρ(aij)]}i with σij the renaming induced
by ρ on aij ;● S ′T = {r ↦ initT {k ↦ kr} ∣ r ∈ ref(K,ρ)};● S ′R = {initR{k ↦ kr} ∣ r ∈ ref(K,ρ)}.
Proposition 4: If ta = ta1.ta2 is a well-formed annotated
trace and K(ta1.ta2)ρ ta1ρÐÐ→ K then K(ta1)ρ ta1ρÐÐ→ K ′ with
φ(K) = φ(K ′).
Proof. The argument is the same as for Proposition 3: extra
processes and references that are added to the ground config-
uration K(ta1)ρ when considering K(ta1.ta2)ρ are unused in
the execution of ta1ρ. ◻
Proposition 5: Let ta be a well-formed annotated trace
and ρ be a renaming of annotations. If K(ta)ρ taρÐ→ (P;φ;S)
then K(taρ) taρÔ⇒ (P ′;φ;S).
Proof. The sets of annotations involved in K(taρ) andK(ta)ρ are the same, thus we have:
● when considering K(ta)ρ and K(taρ) as multisets of pro-
cesses without sequence, we obtain the same multisets;● store(K(ta)ρ) = store(K(taρ)) = S, by definition of the
renaming on ground configurations.
Moreover, as we consider a renaming ρ that maps a sequence
of annotations to a single session sequence of annotations,
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there is no sequence in K(taρ) (because we cannot have two
tag processes sharing the same references).
As a result, when a process P [ρ(a)] is available in the
execution starting from K(ta)ρ then this process is also
available in the execution starting from K(taρ) because no
process is blocked by a sequence in this execution. ◻
C. Frame idealisations
Before establishing here the main result regarding frame
opacity, we first generalise the notion of frame idealisation to
consider more complex idealisation operators.
We will obtain idealised frames by replacing each output
message by a message built from session parameters and from
the idealisations of previously inputted messages. The precise
construction will depend on the specific output, identified by
its label `.
We consider two disjoint and countable subsets of variables:
input variables X i = {xi1, xi2, . . .} ⊆ X and name variablesX n = {xn1 , xn2 , . . .} ⊆ X . Variable xij will refer to the j-th input
received by a given agent. Variables in X n will refer to fresh
names used in the idealised frame. We also assume a fixed but
arbitrary idealisation operator ideal(⋅) ∶ L↦ T (Σ,X i ∪X n).
We assume that input variables appearing in the term ideal(`)
are in {xi1, . . . , xik} where k is the number of inputs preceeding
the output labelled `.
Thus, compared to the simplified presentation of Sec-
tion IV-B, idealisation operators may now refer to input
variables, and rely on arbitrary function symbols (not only
constructor symbols). The notion of idealised frame is thus a
bit more complex and is now defined inductively.
Definition 18: Let fr ∶ A × X n ↦ N be an injective
function assigning names to annotation and name variable. We
define the idealised frame associated to ta, denoted Φfrideal(ta),
inductively on the annotated trace ta:● Φfrideal() = ∅;● Φfrideal(ta.α) = Φfrideal(ta) if α is not an output;● Φfrideal(ta.(` ∶ out(c,w)[a])) = Φfrideal(ta) ∪ {w ↦
ideal(`)σiσn⇓} where:
– σn(xnj ) = fr(a, xnj ) when xnj ∈ X n,
– and σi(xij) = RjΦfrideal(ta) when xij ∈ X i and Rj is
the recipe corresponding to the j-th input of a in ta.
This definition is in line with Definition 18 where the
application of σi and ⇓ were useless. Note also that this
notion is not necessarily well-defined since, for some cases,
ideal(`)σiσn might not evaluate to a message. Due to that,
the definition of frame opacity has to be slightly adapted.
Definition 19: The protocol Π ensures frame opacity
w.r.t. the idealisation operator ideal if for any execution(MΠ;∅;S) taÐ→ (Q;φ;S ′) we have that Φideal(ta) is well-
defined and Φideal(ta) ∼ φ.
The strength of frame opacity lies in the fact that idealised
frames do not depend on the names and states of the agents
involved in an execution. This allows to show that, when
a renaming preserves executability, the resulting frame is
statically equivalent to the original one.
Proposition 6: Assume that Π satisfies frame opacity. Let
ρ be a renaming of annotations and ta be a well-formed
annotated trace. If we have both K(ta) taÔ⇒ (P1;φ1;S1) andK(taρ) taρÔ⇒ (P2;φ2;S2), then φ1 ∼ φ2.
Proof. As in [21], the idealised frames Φideal(ta) and
Φideal(taρ) are equal up to an α-renaming and thus they are
statically equivalent. ◻
D. Renaming does not break executability
We now show a key lemma, stating that for any renaming,
if K(ta) can execute an annotated trace ta then K(ta)ρ can
execute the renamed annotated trace taρ. We rely for this
on the notion of bi-process, i.e. processes in which terms
are replaced by bi-terms, denoted choice[t1, t2]. Such a bi-
process can evolve if both sides of the bi-process agree on the
outcome of a rule. For instance, in case of evaluation of a let
instruction, both sides evaluate positively (resp. negatively).
Otherwise, the bi-process is blocked. Given a bi-process B,
we denote fst(B) the process obtained from B by replacing
any occurrence of choice[t1, t2] by t1. The process snd(B) is
defined in a similar way.
Lemma 1: We assume that Π ensures frame opacity, well-
authentication and no desynchronisation. Let ta be a well-
formed annotated trace such that K(ta) taÐ→ (P;φ;S). Let
ρ be a renaming according to Definition 17. We have thatK(ta)ρ taρÐ→ (Q;ψ;Z) for some ψ such that φ ∼ ψ.
Proof. Processes in the ground configurations K(ta) andK(ta)ρ having the same shape (they differ only by their
terms), we introduce bi-configurations whith the following
syntax and semantics.
We note a bi-configuration B = (PB ;φB ; choice[S1,S2])
where PB is a set of bi-processes and φB is a bi-frame, i.e.
processes and frames where terms are bi-terms of the form
choice[t1, t2]. The notation choice[S1,S2] means that stores
are not bi-stores and evolve independently: the bi-matching
concerns only processes and frames.
Outputs of the bi-process B obtained from K(ta) andK(ta)ρ are decorated with handles from W used to store the
corresponding output bi-messages (one handle for each output
of the bi-process, all handles distinct).
We also associate a vector R of terms in T (Σpub,W ∪X )
to each safe conditional of the protocol. We note that R may
contain variables from X corresponding to inputs performed
before the conditional. These variables cannot refer to values
from the store by definition of a safe conditional. These
variables will be instantiated by ground terms during the
execution.
For any prefix K(ta) ta0Ð→ (P0;φ0;S0) of the executionK(ta) taÐ→ (P;φ;S), we prove that there exists an executionK(ta)ρ ta0ρÐÐ→ (Q0;ψ0;Z0) with those invariants:
(a) B
choice[ta0,ta0ρ]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ B0 with fst(B0) = (P0;φ0;S0) and
snd(B0) = (Q0;ψ0;Z0);
(b) any bi-conditional let z = choice[tl, tr] in BP else BQ
labeled with R is such that R = C[R1, . . . ,Rk]
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with C a sequence of contexts built on Σpub, and
Ri ∈ T (Σpub,W ∪ X ) is either a variable in X or a
w ∉ dom(φ0) or a term in T (Σpub,dom(φ0)). More-
over, we have that C[R1φ+0⇓, . . . ,Rkφ+0⇓] = tl and
C[R1ψ+0⇓, . . . ,Rkψ+0⇓] = tr where φ+0 (resp. ψ+0 ) is φ0
(resp. ψ0) extended with w ↦ u for each output out(c, u)
decorated with w preceding the conditional in fst(B0)
(resp. snd(B0)), i.e. extended with outputs that have not
yet occured;
(c) φ0 ∼ ψ0.
We prove this by induction on the length of the prefix ta0
of ta. In case ta0 is empty, the three conditions trivially holds.
In particular, (b) is a consequence of our definition of being
a safe conditional. We now consider the case where ta0 is of
the form ta′0.α.
We note a the annotation associated to the action α pro-
duced by a process also annotated a in P0. By construction
of a ground configuration, the action α can be an input, an
output, a conditional (let or lookup ), a τ action produced by
the rules SET or GET, or a τabort action.
We have that K(ta) ta′0Ð→ (P ′0;φ′0;S ′0) αÐ→ (P0;φ0;S0) is
a prefix of the execution K(ta) taÐ→ (P;φ;S) and thus by
induction hypothesis, we know that there exists an executionK(ta)ρ ta′0ρÐÐ→ (Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0) satisfying the three invariants
mentionned above. In particular, we have that
B
choice[ta′0,ta′0ρ]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ B′0
for some bi-process B′0 such that fst(B′0) = (P ′0;φ′0;S ′0),
and snd(B′0) = (Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0). We have (P ′0;φ′0;S ′0) α[a]ÐÐ→(P0;φ0;S0). We have to prove that there exists an execution(Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0) α[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐ→ (Q0;ψ0;Z0) that preserves our invari-
ants.
● Case where α is an output. As (P ′0;φ′0;S ′0) and(Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0) form a bi-process, namely B′0, (Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0)
can obviously perform α[ρ(a)] on the same channel
and with the same handle, so (Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0) α[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐ→(Q0;ψ0;Z0), and the bi-process B0 obtained from B′0
by executing this output satisfies (a). Condition (b) can
be established as in [21]. Note that even if the frame
φ′0 (resp. ψ′0) has evolved in φ0 (resp, ψ0), we have
that φ+0 = φ′0+ (resp. ψ+0 = ψ′0+). It remains to establish
our invariant (c). By applying Proposition 3 (item 4) onK(ta) ta′0.α[a]ÐÐÐÐ→ (P0;φ0;S0), we obtain:
K(ta′0.α[a]) ta′0.α[a]ÐÐÐÐ→ (P ′′0 ;φ0;S ′′0 )
Proposition 4 on K(ta)ρ ta′0ρ.α[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ (Q0;ψ0;Z0) gives:
K(ta′0.α[a])ρ ta′0ρ.α[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ (Q′′0 ;ψ0;Z ′′0 )
We conclude φ0 ∼ ψ0 using Proposition 5 and Proposi-
tion 6 and relying on the fact that frame opacity holds
● Case where α is a conditional (let or lookup). We note
τx (resp. τy) the action produced by evaluating the
conditional of the annotation a (resp. ρ(a)). We have(P ′0;φ′0;S ′0) τx[a]ÐÐÐ→ (P0;φ′0;S0) (frames are the same
because evaluating a conditional does not change the
frames). Q′0 can perform τy[ρ(a)], so there exists an
execution (Q′0;ψ′0;Z ′0) α[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐ→ (Q0;ψ′0;Z0).
We first prove that the outcome of the test is the same, i.e.
τx = τthen if, and only if, τy = τthen. In case the conditional
is a safe one, as done in [21], the term R labelling the
conditional on both side is a recipe and it allows us to
ensure that the conditional will be evaluated in the same
way on both side of the bi-process. Thus, we consider
the case where the conditional is unsafe. As the case of
an output, applying Proposition 3.(4) and Proposition 4,
we have that:
K(ta′0.τx[a]) ta′0.τx[a]ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (P ′′0 ;φ′0;S ′′0 )
K(ta′0.τy[a])ρ ta′0ρ.τy[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ (Q′′0 ;ψ′0;Z ′′0 )
Let assume that τx = τthen. Using Proposition 3 and the
well-authentication condition, we have MΠ ta′0.τthen[a]ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→(P ′′0 ;φ′0;S ′′0 ) and there exists a′ such that the annota-
tions a and a′ have an honest interaction in (ta′0, φ′0).
Thus, ρ(a) and ρ(a′) also have an honest interaction in(ta′0ρ,ψ′0) because:
– obs(ta′0) and obs(ta′0ρ) are equal up to annotations;
– for any action in( ,Ri) occurring in ta′0, we have
Riφ
′
0⇓wiφ′0, we deduce Riψ′0⇓wiψ′0 using invariant
(c).
As a result, we have MΠ ta′0ρ.τy[ρ(a)]ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ (Q′′0 ;ψ′0;Z ′′0 )
and there exists ρ(a′) such that the annotations ρ(a) and
ρ(a′) have an honest interaction in (ta′0ρ,ψ′0).
We conclude τy = τthen using the no desynchronisation
condition2. The other direction, i.e.
τy = τthen ⇒ τx = τthen
can be established in a similar way. Note that in case the
conditional is made by a lookup construct (reader role),
updating the database does not break the invariants.● Case where α = in(c,Rin) is an input. As in the case of
an output, this action can be mimicked on the right hand
side of the bi-process. The terms used to decorate safe
conditionals have to be updated by replacing the variable
x occurring in input by Rin, thus the invariant will be
2In [21] the argument is very different here. The corresponding lemma
imposes a further condition on ρ ensuring that, at this point in the proof,
ρ(a) and ρ(a′) share the same identity. Hence, their interaction is (an
alpha-renaming of) the (assumed) honest execution of the protocol, where
all conditions evaluate positively. The assumption on ρ does not make sense
due to our generic readers, and the fact that tags and readers sharing the
same identity must have the honest interaction becomes incorrect in presence
of state: our no desynchronisation condition avoids these problems while
providing a meaningful condition on protocols.
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preserved. Frames are still in static equivalence as they
remain unchanged.● Case where α is a τ action produced by the rule GET
or SET. This case is easy since stores of the bi-process
may evolve separately. No relation has to be preserved
between the elements stored on the left and those stored
on the right. In case of the rule GET, by construction of
a ground configuration, any memory-cell lookup is well-
defined because the reference is already initialised in the
store, so this action can be mimicked on the left.● Case where α is a τabort action produced by the rule
ABORT. This case is easy since the bi-process ensures
that fst(B′0) and snd(B′0) have the same shape. In case
ABORT can be applied on fst(B′0), the rule can thus be
also applied on snd(B′0). Our invariants are satisfied.
This concludes the proof. ◻
E. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1: Let Π be a protocol together with an
idealisation operator ideal(.) for it, such that:● Π ensures frame opacity w.r.t. to ideal;● Π is well-authenticating; and● Π ensures that no desynchronisation occurs.
We have that Π satisfies unlinkability.
Proof. The inclusion SΠ ⊑ MΠ is trivial. It remains to
establish that MΠ ⊑ SΠ.
Consider an execution MΠ taÐ→ (P;φ;S). Proposition 3
gives us that there exists a well-formed annotated trace ta′ τ= ta
such that K(ta) ta′Ð→ (P ′;φ;S ′).
Let ρ be an arbitrary renaming of annotations. Existence is
guaranteed, as the following construction shows. Let ref ρ ∶N ∗ ↦ R be an injective function that associates to any
sequence of names n a reference in R. We then define ρ as
follows:
T (r, nT ) ↦ T (ref ρ(nT ), nT )
R(nR) ↦ R(nR)
The mapping ρ is a renaming of annotations because:● ρ is role-preserving;● ρ is single-session because all references are disjoint since
ref ρ is injective ;● ρ preserves the well-formedness of any sequence of
annotations.
By Lemma 1, we have that K(ta)ρ ta′ρÐÐ→ (Q;ψ;Z) for
some frame ψ such that ψ ∼ φ. By Proposition 5 we
deduce that K(taρ) ta′ρÔÔ⇒ (Q;ψ;Z), and thus K(taρ) taρÔ⇒(Q;ψ;Z). Since taρ is single-session, Proposition 3 implies
that (SΠ;∅;∅) taρÔ⇒ (Q′;ψ;Z ′). We thus conclude thatMΠ ⊑ SΠ. ◻
APPENDIX C
CASE STUDIES
We present in Figures 7 to 16 the descriptions of the
protocols studied in Section VI.
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
newnT
get r as kT ⟨nT ,h(kT , nT )⟩
input ⟨x1, x2⟩
ok
if ∃kR ∈ DB, x2 = h(kR, x1)
error
else
Fig. 7. Basic Hash
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
input x
newnT
get r as kT ⟨nT ,h(x,nT , kT )⟩
input ⟨x1, x2⟩
ok
if ∃kR ∈ DB, x2 = h(nR, x1, kR)
error
else
Fig. 8. Hash-Lock
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r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
input x1
newnT
get r as kT
senc(⟨x1, nT ⟩, kT )
input x2
xT ∶= proj2(sdec(x2, kR))
senc(⟨xT , nR⟩, kR)
input x3
ok
if x3 = senc(⟨nT , x1⟩, kT )
error
else
if ∃kR ∈ DB, proj1(sdec(x2, kR)) = nR
error
else
Fig. 9. Feldhofer
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
get r as kT
r ← hash(kT )
g(kT )
input x
remove kR from DB
add hashn+1(kR) in DB
ok
if ∃kR ∈ DB, x = g(hashn(kR)) with n ≥ 0
error
else
Fig. 10. OSK v1
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
get r as kT
r ← hash(kT )
g(kT )
input x
ok
if ∃kR ∈ DB, x = g(hashn(kR)) with n ≥ 0
error
else
Fig. 11. OSK v2
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r ← kTag ⟨⊥, k⟩ ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
input x1
newnT
get r as kT ⟨nT ,h(x1, nT , kT )⟩
input ⟨x21, x22⟩
remove ⟨k0R, kR⟩ from DB
add ⟨kR,hkey(kR)⟩ in DB
h(x22, kR, nR)
input x3
r ← hkey(kT )
ok
if x3 = h(h(x1, nT , kT ), kT , x1)
error
else
if ∃⟨k0R, kR⟩ ∈ DB, x22 = h(nR, x21, kR)
h(x22, k0R, nR)
input x3
r ← hkey(kT )
ok
if x3 = h(h(x1, nT , kT ), kT , x1)
error
else
if ∃⟨k0R, kR⟩ ∈ DB, x22 = h(nR, x21, k0R)
error
else
Fig. 12. LAK (pairs)
r ← kTag k ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
input x1
newnT
get r as kT ⟨nT ,h(x1, nT , kT )⟩
input ⟨x21, x22⟩
h(x22, kR, nR)
input x3
ok
if x3 = h(h(x1, nT , kT ), kT , x1)
error
else
if ∃kR ∈ DB, x22 = h(nR, x21, kR)
error
else
Fig. 13. LAK (pairs, fix v1)
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r ← kTag ⟨k,0⟩ ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
input x1
newnT
get r as kT ⟨nT ,h(x1, nT , kT )⟩
input ⟨x21, x22⟩
remove ⟨k0, n⟩ from DB
add ⟨k0, n + 1⟩ in DB
h(x22,hkeyn(k0), nR)
input x3
r ← hkey(kT )
ok
if x3 = h(h(x1, nT , kT ), kT , x1)
error
else
if ∃⟨k0, n⟩ ∈ DB, x22 = h(nR, x21,hkeyn(k0))
h(x22,hkeyp(k0), nR)
input x3
r ← hkey(kT )
ok
if x3 = h(h(x1, nT , kT ), kT , x1)
error
else
if ∃⟨k0, n⟩ ∈ DB, p < n, x22 = h(nR, x21,hkeyp(k0))
error
else
Fig. 14. LAK (pairs, fix v2)
r ← kTag ⟨⊥, k⟩ ∈ DBReader
newnR
nR
newnT
⟨nT ,h(nR, nT , k)⟩
r ← hkey(k) remove ⟨⊥, k⟩ from DB
add ⟨k,hkey(k)⟩ in DB
r ← hkey2(k) remove ⟨k,hkey(k)⟩ from DB
add ⟨hkey(k),hkey2(k)⟩ in DB
2 successful interactions
⟨nT ,h(nR, nT , k)⟩
error
Fig. 15. Linkability attack for LAK (pairs)
This scenario is an attack for our condition no desynchroni-
sation and also for unlinkability: by replaying a tag’s ouput,
an attacker can know if this tag has successfully interacted at
most twice with the reader. This scenario cannot be mimicked
in a system where each tag can play only one session.
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r ← ⟨kIMSI , IMSI, pkN ⟩Mobile Station ⟨kIMSI , IMSI⟩ ∈ DB, skNNetwork
newn1
n1
input x1
newn2
get r as ⟨kIMSI , IMSI, pkN ⟩
aenc(⟨⟨kIMSI , x1⟩, n2⟩, pkN)
input x2
newRAND
x ∶= proj2(adec(x2, skN))
⟨RAND, f5(kIMSI , ⟨RAND,x⟩)⟩
input ⟨x31, x32⟩
f2(kIMSI , x31)
input x4
ok
if x4 = f2(kIMSI ,RAND)
error
else
if x32 = f5(kIMSI , ⟨x31, n2⟩)
error
else
if ∃⟨kIMSI , IMSI⟩ ∈ DB, proj1(adec(x2, skN)) = ⟨kIMSI , n1⟩
error
else
Fig. 16. AKA (simplified)
Here, skN represents the network unique private key and
pkN is the corresponding public key, i.e. pkN = pk(skN).
The symbols aenc and adec model asymmetric encryp-
tion and decryption, with the following rewriting rule:
adec(aenc(m,pk(sk)), sk) =m.
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